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I. INTRODUCTION
The factors that influence a person suspected of a criminal offense
either to admit or deny guilt are obviously complex and difficult to dis-
cern and analyze. Notwithstanding the sustained attention the law has
given to the subject of confessions," the legal effect of a demonstration
that certain factors have influenced the decision to confess is far from
clear. This confusion persists even now that the law has apparently
passed through the transitional period extending from the "voluntari-
ness" test of the past to the Miranda rules of the present. Despite the
establishment of Miranda v. Arizona' as the major legal doctrine relating
to confessions and incriminating statements, the impact of a defendant's
state of mind at the time of confession on the admissibility of that con-
fession into evidence remains painfully unclear.
This Article is an examination of the legal significance of several
1. The term "confession" will be used interchangeably with "self-incriminating
statement." Despite occasional holdings to the contrary, it seems well established that
legal rules relating to statements admitting all elements of a criminal offense also apply
to admissions of less than all elements and to statements intended to be exculpatory that
ultimately become evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-
77 (1966); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1897). There appear to be
no policy grounds for drawing distinctions between such statements.
The corpus delicti rule is sometimes phrased as a requirement of admissibility, de-
manding that the prosecution introduce independent proof of the corpus delicti before
the defendant's confession may be introduced. See, e.g., State v. Weis, 92 Ariz. 254,
260, 375 P.2d 735, 739 (1962), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967). It is generally
agreed, however, that the trial judge may, without committing reversible error, exercise
his discretionary power over the order of evidence and accept a confession subject to
later proof of the corpus delicti by other evidence. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 83
Ariz. 279, 320 P.2d 467 (1958). The functional effect of the rule, then, is to impose
a requirement concerning the total proof necessary to sustain a conviction rather than
to define the foundation necessary for the introduction of a confession. See McCoRMICIC,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF EvmENCE § 158, at 346-47 (2d ed. 1972). The "law of
confession," as used in this Article, does not include the corpus delicti rule, the require-
ment of corroboration, or similar matters.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see text accompanying note 82 infra.
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possible characteristics of a confessing defendant's state of mind: his
ignorance or mistake concerning the facts or the law relating thereto
(whether influenced by affirmative and intentional deception by law
enforcement authorities, by good faith promises and representations of
such persons, or by other factors) and reliance upon expectations that
he will in some way benefit from the confession. The thesis presented
here is that the lack of clarity in regard to these issues results from
the selection of legal vehicles manifestly inappropriate for dealing with
the underlying problems and that such selection has been due largely
to an unwillingness to deal specifically with the issues. The current
approach needs to be replaced-or at least supplemented-by a more
direct analysis of the problems related to confessions. At the same
time, more careful attention must be directed to the long-term objec-
tives that can be furthered by rules concerning the admissiblity of con-
fessions and the procedural means by which these objectives can be
implemented at minimal cost.
The subject matter of this Article is of critical importance because
of the manner in which our criminal justice system processes defend-
ants. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, a defendant is likely to ob-
tain a dispositional advantage by cooperating with prosecution authori-
ties, and the earlier such cooperation begins, the greater the advantage
is likely to be. In a significant number of circumstances involving con-
fessions, however, defendants are ignorant or mistaken about their full
factual situation,3 the law relating to that situation,4 or the legal effect
of their decision to confess.5 While the precise extent of this misap-
prehension cannot be documented, it is likely that criminal defendants
are often required to choose whether or not to confess at a time when
they are ignorant of significant factors relating to the tactical wisdom
of confessing. Yet this is also when the failure to begin cooperating
by confessing-for whatever reason-may well adversely affect their
ability to achieve the most lenient disposition if they are later found
guilty.
3. See, e.g., Layton v. State, - Ind. -, 301 N.E.2d 633 (1973) (defendant testi-
fied that when he confessed to an assault, he was unaware that the victim had died).
4. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defendant admitted partici-
pation in a shooting, apparently unaware that under the law of parties his participation
made him liable for the shooting itself).
5. For example, in one study, forty-five percent of the defendants interviewed be-
lieved that an oral statement made to police could not be used in court against them.
Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENvER
L.J. 1, 15-16 (1970).
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Initially, it is necessary to recognize that there are at least three
dimensions to the problem of the defendant's conscious awareness at
the time he makes a self-incriminating statement. The first dimension
is the subject of this awareness. The defendant may have-or may
lack-a certain awareness concerning the facts of the incident, the law
that determines whether or not there was criminal activity involved, the
law that determines his liability for criminal activity, the evidence avail-
able to prove his liability for the incident, or other matters that may
affect whether he will be convicted and how he will be punished. The
second dimension is the extent of this awareness. The defendant
simply may not have addressed the matter and thus lack any awareness;
he may have an accurate understanding of the matter; or finally, he
may have an inaccurate or incomplete understanding. The third di-
mension is the cause of this awareness or lack of awareness. Although
there are obviously countless factors involved, for present purposes the
most important are the defendant's previous "life experiences," his re-
liance upon well-known or widely disseminated practices, any affirma-
tive action by law enforcement officers, and the failure of law enforce-
ment officers to correct an apparent or suspected misapprehension or
state of ignorance.
In regard to the first dimension, this discussion will be limited to the
defendant's awareness of the factual circumstances bearing upon the
tactical wisdom of confessing, such as those matters enumerated in the
preceding paragraph. This awareness must be distinguished from his
awareness of other matters, such as the sympathy the interrogating offi-
cers may have for him, his prior activities, or his present plight. Those
matters are better regarded as part of the question whether the law
should exploit-or, if a misunderstanding concerning this sympathy is
intentionally created, manipulate-a suspect's emotional reaction to a
situation that he fully understands on an intellectual level. That ques-
tion, while undoubtedly an important one, is beyond the scope, of the
present discussion. Thus no effort is made to deal with issues pre-
sented by interrogations involving no deception with respect to the fac-
tual circumstances of a suspect's situation but in which officers-ac-
curately or not-indicate emotional sympathy for anyone confronted
with a situation similar to that leading to the commission of the crime
under investigation.
This Article will begin by tracing generally the development of the
law of confessions and then will return to examine more specifically
[Vol. 1975:275
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the way in which the subject's conscious awareness has been treated
during the various stages of this evolution. Thereafter, attention will
be focused on the need to define and refine the matter and on the vari-
ous considerations that need to be taken into account; one way in which
existing law can be modified in order to accommodate these considera-
tions will be discussed.
H. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONFESSION LAW
Contemporary legal rules relating to the admissibility of confessions
-including those rules concerning ignorance, mistake, and reliance-
have roots deep in English common law. Examination of these origins
is necessary not only to determine the content and basis of present doc-
trines, but also to gauge the effectiveness of various approaches in deal-
ing with the manner in which self-incriminating statements are ob-
tained and used to secure criminal convictions. Because the confused
state of current doctrines is, in fact, the direct result of complex histori-
cal development, the several doctrines that constitute the law of confes-
sions can be understood only if examined in light of that history. This
evolution of confession law can be broken down into three discernible
periods: development of the original common law requirement of
voluntariness; embodiment of part or all of the voluntariness require-
ment within the constitutional imperatives of due process; and recent
efforts to replace or supplement traditional doctrines with objective
standards.
A. The Voluntariness Requirement in English
and Early American Law
In early English practice, confessions made "under threats and
promises"6 were inadmissible,7 although the use of an approver's con-
6. "Threats" and "promises" have not always been easy to distinguish from each
other or from those communications not creating fatal defects in a confession. When
a communication relates to the future processing of a case, it is difficult to determine
whether it is a "promise" that some benefit will result from confession or a "threat" that
some disadvantage will flow from the absence of confession. 'Threat" seems to carry
with it, however, the prediction of unlawful force or pressure. For purposes of this dis-
cusaion, "promises" will be used to describe communications conveying the impression
to subjects that they will benefit from confessing, whether that benefit consists of enjoy-
ing something they would not otherwise enjoy or escaping a misfortune they would
otherwise experience. 'Threat," on the other hand, will be used to describe a communi-
cation conveying the impression that improper pressures, whether physical or psychologi-
cal, will be exerted if the subject declines to confess. A "threat," then, must involve
communication of willingness to do something the threatener cannot properly do;
Vol. 1975:275] 279
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:275
fession (made with the expectation that pardon would result) against
the approver in certain circumstances8 suggests that this early prohibi-
tion against "promises" was not absolute. In any case, there is no
doubt that the rationale for this rule of inadmissibility was the per-
ceived unreliability of such statements:
[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be con-
sidered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it;
and therefore it is rejected. 9
During the nineteenth century the rule, especially the prohibition
against promises of benefits, was applied with vigor by the English
courts. Confessions were held inadmissible for -having been made in
response to inducement if the defendant had been informed simply that
it would be better if he told the truth.10
"promises," on the other hand, may-but need not--communicate a willingness to deal
with the subject in a manner which is permissible under the law, often in the form of
a discretionary action such as choice of sentence. This terminology is likely to assist
clear analysis; it is not, however, necessarily consistent with the use of these terms in
judicial opinions.
7. Lord Mansfield, in The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (K.B. 1775)
noted:
The instance has frequently happened, of persons having made confessions
under threat or promises: the consequence as frequently has been, that such
examinations and confessions have not been made use of against them on
their trial.
8. An approver was a person indicted for a crime who confessed his own guilt and
testified against at least two accomplices. If he met all the requirements, the approver
was entitled to a pardon. The process was a risky one, however. If the approver failed
to disclose the entire truth, if his testimony established that he was a principal, if he
was unable to recount fully and accurately his initial statement, or if his accomplices
were not convicted, the approver was convicted on the basis of his confession and put
to death. See The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 162-63 (KB. 1775).
9. The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783).
10. See, e.g., Regina v. Rose, 18 Cox Crim. Cas. 717 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1898) (em-
ployer said to defendant, "'You had better tell me about all the corn that is gone,"'
and "'it would be better'" for him to tell the truth); Regina v. Mansfield, 14 Cox
Crim. Cas. 639 (N.P. 1881) (fifteen-year-old domestic servant girl accused by constable
of setting fire to haystack, said to her mistress, "'If you will forgive me I will tell you
the truth,"' and mistress replied, "'Ann, did you do it?"); The Queen v. Croydon, 2
Cox Crim. Cas. 67 (N.P. 1846) (attorney said to defendant, "'I dare say you had a
hand in it; you may as well tell me about it? "); Rex v. Partridge, 173 Eng. Rep. 243
(N.P. 1836) (complainant told defendant, "'I should be obliged to you if you would
tell us what you know about it; if you will not, we of course can do nothing; I shall
be glad if you will! "); Rex v. Thomas, 172 Eng. Rep. 1273, 1274 (N.P. 1834) (person
said to one of several suspected robbers in custody, "'You had better split, and not suffer
for all of them"'); Rex v. Mills, 172 Eng. Rep. 1183 (N.P. 1833) (constable said to
defendant in custody for theft, "'It is of no use for you to deny it, for there is the man
280
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Nevertheless, several exceptions combined to ameliorate, to some
extent, the effect of the general rule. "Spiritual admonitions," for in-
stance, were held to have no impact upon the admissibility of a con-
fession if they did no more than draw the defendant's attention to the
spiritual benefits to be derived from the confessing."' Inducements or
promises made by a person who was not in a position of authority with
respect to the defendant or his case were sometimes considered to have
no effect upon the admissibility of a statement,12 although the early
case law reveals no uniformity on the subject. 3 Finally, some' justices
and boy who will swear they saw you do it! "); Rex v. Enoch, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (N.P.
1833) (guard told woman arrested and charged jointly with man for murder "that she
had better tell the truth or it would lie upon her, and the man would go free"); Rex
v. Dunn, 172 Eng. Rep. 817 (N.P. 1831) (private person told defendant that "he had
better tell where he got it"); Rex v. Kingston, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (N.P. 1783) (surgeon,
called in, told defendant charged with attempted murder, "[Y]ou are under suspicion of
this, and you had better tell all you know").
The English rule apparently remains very much the same. See, e.g., Regina v.
Zaveckas, [1970] 1 All E.R. 413, 414 (C.A. 1969) (defendant said to officer, "'If I
make a statement, will you give me bail now?"' and officer replied, "'Yes "); Regina
v. Northam, 52 Crim. App. 97 (CA. 1967) (defendant, on bail for one housebreaking,
was questioned about another; he raised the possibility of accepting responsibility for
second and having it taken into consideration on sentencing for the first rather than hay-
mg an indictment and detention on a separate charge; officer indicated the police would
not oppose this).
11. See, e.g., Rex v. Wild, 168 Eng. Rep. 1341, 1341-42 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1835) (con-
stable said to defendant, "'[Niow kneel you down by the side of me and tell me the
truth . . . . I [am] going to ask . . . a very serious question, and I Ihope you will]
tell the truth in the presence of the Almighty. Did these children fall into the pit?"'
[statement held "strictly admissible," but judges "much disapproved of the mode in
which it was obtained"]); Rex v. Gilham, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1828)
(prison chaplain prayed with defendant and persuaded him that it would be to his
spiritual advantage to confess).
12. See, e.g., R. CRoss, EVmENCE 448 (2d ed. 1963). See Rex v. Gibbons, 171 Eng.
Rep. 1117, 1117-18 (N.P. 1823) (confession, given to surgeon some time after person
"having no authority of any sort" told defendant "she had better tell all," held inadmis-
ile).
13. In Rex v. Spencer, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (N.P. 1837), an unidentified person told
the defendant he had better confess. When the confession was offered, the trial judge
noted a division of opinions on the admissibility of such confessions, but indicated a
willingness to accept it. Compare Rex v. Gilham, 168 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Cr. Cas. Res.
1828), cited in note 11 supra, with Rex v. Kingston, 172 Eng. Rep. 752 (N.P. 1783),
cited in note 10 supra. Apparently, actual authority was unnecessary if the defendant
reasonably believed that the person had authority. See Regina v. Frewin, 6 Cox Crim.
Cas. 530 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1855) (confession, made to coworker who told defendant it
would be a good deal better for him to confess, was inadmissible because although co-
worker had not contacted him on behalf of employer, defendant might reasonably have
supposed that coworker had acted on employer's behalf).
281
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believed that the offering of an inducement unrelated to the contem-
plated criminal proceedings did not affect the admissibility of a con-
fession;14 this question was not resolved until 1966 when the House
of Lords held that the collateral nature of an inducement did not pre-
vent it from rendering a confession inadmissible.'" The expectation
of benefit that would render a confession involuntary, however, had to
be based upon specific and identifiable promises or representations;
a mere showing that the defendant anticipated reaping a benefit in the
litigation was insufficient.16
Despite the substantial number of involuntary confession cases heard
in English courts during the nineteenth century, there was little case
law considering the effect of official deception. The early treatise
writers agreed, however, that official deception would not render a
statement inadmissible, 1 7 citing an unreported case in which the de-
fendant confessed after being falsely told that his alleged accomplices
were in custody.18 Further support for this interpretation of the early
position was available in several cases holding that confessions given
to persons who had promised not to reveal them were not inadmis-
sible. 9
This, then, was the common law background of confession law that
laid the basis for current doctrine. In determining the admissibility of
a statement, the English courts emphasized the defendant's conscious
awareness at the time of confessing. Thus, expectation of a specific
benefit in the criminal proceedings-especially if this was induced by
14. See, e.g., Rex v. Lloyd, 172 Eng. Rep. 1291 (N.P. 1834) (telling defendant that
if he made statement he could see his wife, who was also in custody for same offense,
did not render statement inadmissible),
15. Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, [1967] 1 A.C. 760, 818-21
(1966).
16. See, e.g., Regina v. Warren, 11 L.T. (o.s.) 516, 12 J.P. 571 (N.P. 1848) (con-
fession prefaced by statement of defendant, "'I shall confess, for I think it will be bet-
ter for me,"' admissible because no inducement held out to defendant to render it in-
voluntary). See also Rex v. Godinho, 7 Crim. App. 12 (1911) (confession by defend-
ant, made in hope that king would pardon him, admissible because no one held out hope
of pardon).
17. 2 S. PmLuPs & I. ARNOLD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 559 (5th
Am. ed. 1868); H. RoscoE, A DIGEsT OF TBE LAW OF EVIDENCB IN CUMINAL CAsES
43-44 (2d Am. ed. T. Granger 1840); 2 T. STAKm, A PRACnTCAL TREATISB ON THn LAW
OF EviENcE 49 (4th Am. ed. 1832).
18. Rex v. Burley, discussed in sources cited note 17 supra. Starkie reports that the
conviction "was approved by all the judges." T. STARKM, supra note 17, at 17 n.(m).
19. See, e.g., Rex v. Thomas, 173 Eng. Rep. 154 (N.P. 1836); Rex v. Shaw, 172
Eng. Rep. 1282 (N.P. 1834).
[Vol. 1975:275
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the representations of a person in a position of lawful authority in the
criminal prosecution system-rendered the statement subject to objec-
tion. But the common law authorities did not reach the more subtle
aspects of a defendant's understanding-or misunderstanding-of the
facts surrounding his alleged offense, the evidence available tending
to prove his guilt, or the admissibility of that evidence. In fact, it is
arguable that the common law's preoccupation with "inducements"
served to divert attention from these matters.
The common law rule declaring inadmissible a confession induced
by promise of benefits was generally adopted in the United States, but
it was applied with considerably less enthusiasm. This somewhat be-
grudging attitude was evidenced by the requirement, generally ac-
cepted, that any promise or inducement be offered by a person in a
position of authority20 and that it be related to the criminal charges in-
volved before the confession would be considered inadmissible.2 1  But
perhaps more important, the American courts tended generally, but not
uniformly, to require a more positive and direct promise of a benefit or
inducement than the English courts had demanded.22  Thus, despite
20. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 8 F. 232 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881) (private de-
tective representing party injured in crime was not a person in authority because only
prosecuting attorney could bring criminal action). There was some reluctance to rely
on this requirement, however, as evidenced by numerous cases that found inducements
or promises by private persons insufficient to require suppression of the confession, but
on grounds other than the private nature of the person making the promise or induce-
ment. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171 (1842); State v. Hardee, 83 N.C. 619
(1880); State v. Mitchell, 61 N.C. 447 (1868).
21. See, e.g., State v. Hardee, 83 N.C. 619 (1880) (witness' promise to marry de-
fendant if he would tell her about crime had no reference to charges and therefore did
not affect admissibility of statement); State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483, 490 (1878) (promise
by jailer that defendant could be with other prisoners if he confessed was a promise of
a "collateral boon" and did not affect admissibility of statement).
22. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morey, 67 Mass. 461, 462 (1854) (telling defend-
ant that "it was better for all concerned in all cases for the guilty party to confess" and
that confession would be "considered honorable" but would make no difference in legal
proceedings did not affect admissibility); State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171 (1842) (statement
that one of two brothers should confess to save other did not render statement inadmis-
sible); Rice v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App. R. 654, 656, 3 S.W. 791, 792 (1887) (rejecting
approach of earlier cases and holding that statement by owner of stolen property that
"'it would go better with him"' if defendant confessed was not a sufficiently "positive"
promise of benefit). But see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 59 Mass. 605, 606 (1850)
("any direct or implied promise" would invalidate statement; thus comment by officer
that if any part of disclosure was of benefit to the government, he would use his influ-
once to have it go in defendant's favor invalidated statement). The cases decided
shortly after the turn of the century showed an even clearer rejection of the earlier
English approach. See, e.g., State v. Marty, 52 N.D. 478, 486, 203 N.W. 679, 682
Vol. 1975:275] 283
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acceptance of the general rule, its application was less likely to render
a confession inadmissible in the United States than it was in nineteenth,
or even twentieth, century England.
In contrast to their relative restraint in applying the general rule with
respect to induced confessions, the American courts adopted uncritic-
ally and enthusiastically the commentators' interpretation of the com-
mon law relating to official deception. To the Americans, this inter-
pretation embodied the principle that fraud-and therefore mere mis-
take as well-in regard to information that a defendant considered in
deciding to confess would have no effect upon the admissibility of the
confession. 23 The decisions did not explain the willingness to embrace
this principle, but the general hostility of American courts toward legal
impediments to the admissibility of confessions probably played an im-
portant role.
Some courts minimized the effect of the common law rule by adopt-
ing its rationale as a limiting factor. Thus, one can discern in the
American cases a trend toward inquiring whether the inducement or
promise was such that, considering the circumstances, a reasonable
likelihood of a false statement was presented.2 4  This trend was in
(1925) (sheriff's statement that "'the court generally would consider a man pleading
guilty,-that the sentence would be lighter'" did not invalidate statement); State v. Alli-
son, 24 S.D. 622, 625, 124 N.W. 747, 748 (1910) (sheriff's statement that "'tihe best
thing you can do is to tell the truth, and you might get out of it to-day'" did not render
statement inadmissible). Again, however, the trend was not uniform. See People v.
Heide, 302 Ill. 624, 626, 135 N.E. 77, 78 (1922) (telling defendant that if he told the
truth he would be taken to the state attorney's office, and the state attorney would "do
the best for him" rendered statement inadmissible, since "any degree of influence"
renders statement inadmissible under Illinois law). Cf. People v. Klyczek, 307 IIl. 150,
138 N.E. 275 (1923) (merely telling defendant it would be better to tell the truth does
not render statement inadmissible, but it would have this effect if a suggestion of some
benefit is added).
23. Cf., e.g., King v. State, 40 Ala. 314 (1867) (falsely telling defendant that his
accomplice had been arrested and shot did not affect confession); State v. Fredericks,
85 Mo. 145 (1884) (false statement that defendant's accomplice was in custody did not
render statement inadmissible); State v. Mitchell, 61 N.C. 447 (1868) (statement made
to another prisoner was not rendered inadmissible by the other prisoner's informing de-
fendant that one prisoner could not testify against another prisoner).
24. See, e.g., Laub v. State, 24 Ariz. 175, 178, 207 P. 465, 466 (1922) (advising
defendant to tell the truth and telling him it would be better to do so does not auto-
matically render statement inadmissible, but real question is "whether, considering all
the circumstances, the statement. . . may be relied upon as probably stating the truth");
State v. Guie, 56 Mont. 485, 490, 86 P. 329, 331 (1919) ("If the inducements of the
confessing party are such that the prospects of bettering his situation by speaking even
falsely would appeal to him, as a reasonable person, as the better alternative to remain-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/1
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clear contrast to the majority of English cases, which excluded all state-
ments made pursuant to an inducement. The basis of the English
practice appears to have been a belief that some inducements would
create an unacceptable risk of a false statement, and the task of dis-
tinguishing those inducements that did create such a risk from those
that did not was a task too difficult to undertake.
Infrequently, courts recognized that the danger of unreliability was
not the sole basis for screening confessions. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas, for example, stated:
Another ground for excluding confessions induced by threats, or by hope
of reward, has been called "the fox hunter's reason." This proceeds not
only upon the ground that testimony obtained under such circumstances
is unreliable, but upon a spirit of fairness to the accused.25
It is likely, however, that there was a broader but unacknowledged
awareness that exclusion was justified on grounds other than reliability.
This was evident in some of the early deception cases where courts,
although upholding the admissibility of statements obtained by decep-
tion, sometimes condemned the underlying conduct of the police.
These opinions seemed to indicate frustration at the lack of a more ap-
propriate vehicle for dealing with the problem.26  To some extent the
courts engrafted the trustworthiness rationale onto the deception doc-
trine by indicating that deception would render a statement inadmis-
sible if-but only if-the deception created a danger of an inaccurate
statement.
ing silent, then the confession ought not to be received as evidence against him, because
it is testimonially untrustworthy").
25. Pearrow v. State, 146 Ark. 201, 207, 225 S.W. 308, 310 (1920).
26. See, e.g., People v. Dunnigan, 163 Mich. 349, 128 N.W. 180 (1910) (although
it was "reprehensible" to have person offer to convey message to defendant's wife and
then turn message over to authorities, this did not render admission contained in message
inadmissible); McIntosh v. State, 105 Neb. 328, 337, 180 N.W. 573, 576 (1920)
(sheriff's false statement to defendant that other participant had made an affidavit but
"was not playing square," "while hardly commendable," did not render defendant's state-
ment inadmissible); cf. People v. Buffom, 214 N.Y. 53, 108 N.E. 184 (1915) (although
confession obtained by deceit is not inadmissible, if it forms basis for conviction it is
necessary to guard carefully against errors that may have contributed to jury's conclusion
that confession was accurate).
27. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 387, 390 (1859) (where defend-
ant was told that if he could establish that he had no money dealings with victim, "'he
would get clear,"' and defendant then made statement to that effect, this statement was
inadmissible; the representation tended to produce such a statement, whether true or
not); People v. Utter, 217 Mich. 74, 80, 185 N.W. 830, 832 (1921) (placing undercover
agent in jail with defendant did not render statement made to agent inadmissible because
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B. The Development of a Constitutional
Requirement of Voluntariness
The unwillingness of the United States Supreme Court to confront
the true issues in confession cases was evidenced as early as 1884 when
the first such case, Hopt v. Utah,28 reached the Court. There, the
Court apparently considered the admissibility of a confession in a fed-
eral criminal trial to be entirely a matter of federal evidence law with
no constitutional overtones. Noting that the admissibility of such state-
ments "so largely depends upon the special circumstances connected
with the confession, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate
a rule that will comprehend all cases,' 29 the Court-with obvious
relief-concluded that "[i]t is unnecessary in this case that we should
lay down any general rule on the subject" since the admission of the
statement at issue in the case "can be sustained upon . . the weight
of authority."80 That "authority" was summarized as establishing that
a confession of guilt was admissible unless
the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touch-
ing the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the
accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of will
or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the
meaning of the law.81
Subsequent cases continued to treat the issue as one of evidence law
and elaborated to some extent upon the "authority" approved in Hopt
by holding that mere advice to a defendant to tell the truth was not
a "promise" within the meaning of the rule82 and that neither the
simple fact of custody83 nor the failure to warn a defendant that a state-
ment would be used against himss rendered a statement inadmissible.
These cases served as a mere prelude to the difficulties that arose
"[tihere was no proof or claim of any promises by [the agent] tending to induce a false
confession"); Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 A. 161 (1923) (trick which
has no tendency to produce any confession except a true one does not invalidate state-
ment).
28. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
29. Id. at 583.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 585.
32. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1895).
33. Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 (1896).
34. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1896).
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after Bram v. United States35 was decided in 1897. Brain, the first
mate of a ship, was convicted of the murder of the ship's captain, the
murder occurring while the ship was at sea. After suspicion focused
on Brain, he was confined by the crew and delivered to the chief of
police at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Before being returned to the United
States, Brain was interrogated by a detective from the Nova Scotia po-
lice force. This conversation with the detective-although only indi-
rectly incriminating, if at all, since it consisted of a denial of guilt-
was admitted at Brain's trial. On appeal, this admission was asserted
as error.
In contrast to the earlier discussions of admissibility of self-incrimi-
nating statements in terms of evidence law, the Court began its analysis
in Bram with the broad assertion that
[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not volun-
tary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."36
The fifth amendment, in turn, was described as a crystallization of the
law of confessions existing at the time the Constitution was adopted. 37
The Court stated that the "principle by which the admissibility of the
confession of an accused person is to be determined is expressed in
the textbooks"38 and cited with approval a passage from Russell's Trea-
tise on Crimes and Misdemeanors that stated the rule:
"[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary:
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor ob-
tained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the
exertion of any improper influence."39
Another passage cited by the Court, taken from Hawkins' Treatise of
the Pleas of the Crown, clearly regarded the unreliability of these con-
fessions induced by promises or threats to be the basis for their inad-
missibility. 40
35. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
36. Id. at 542.
37. Id. at 543.
38. Id. at 542. /
39. Id. at 542-43, quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMEs AND MISDEmEAN-
ons 478 (6th Eng. ed. 1896).
40. Id. at 547, quoting 2 W. HAwKiNs, A TRATiSE OF THE PLEAS OF TH CR OwN
ch. 46, § 3, n.2 (6th ed. 1787).
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The Court's application of this constitutional rule is puzzling, how-
ever. Apparently, the Court found in the record adequate proof of
both improper threats and an impermissible promise and considered
that either the threats or the promise would alone be sufficient to ren-
der the statement inadmissible. The detective testified that before or
during the interrogation he had stripped Brain and searched him. In
addition, he said to Brain:
"Brain, we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery . . . . Your posi-
tion is rather an awkward one. I have had Brown [another crew mem-
ber] in this office and he made a statement that he saw you do the
murder." 41
Noting decisions making silence in the face of accusations admissible
evidence, the Court held:
the result [of the detective's statement] was to produce upon [Brain's]
mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an ad-
mission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for
trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse
impression would not also have naturally arisen, that by denying there
was hope of removing the suspicion from himself. 42
Therefore the statement was inadmissible because it was a "threat."
But the Court also relied upon an alternative theory. The detective
testified that he had stated to Brain:
"I am satisfied that you killed the captain .... But .. .some of us
here think you could not have done all that crime alone. If you had an
accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible
crime on your own shoulders. '48
The Court acknowledged that this statement could be interpreted as sug-
gesting that a confession naming accomplices would lift the "moral
weight resulting from concealment"44 from Brain's shoulders. So inter-
preted, there would be no improper inducement because it would be
within the exception that a mere admonition to tell the truth, emphasiz-
ing the moral or spiritual benefits flowing from such action, did not ren-
der a statement inadmissible. But, the Court concluded, under all the
circumstances the detective's remarks "imported a suggestion of some
benefit as to the crime and its punishment ' 15 that might be derived
41. Id. at 539.
42. Id. at 562.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 564-65.
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from Bram's making a statement; therefore, the remarks constituted an
impermissible inducement.
Bram appeared to adopt as a matter of constitutional law, then, a
rule that an incriminating statement is involuntary and its admission vio-
lates the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimi-
nation if the defendant made the statement in response to a representa-
tion by a person in authority that the defendant would thereby receive
some sort of benefit in the disposition of his case. The Court expressly
reserved the question of whether an inducement would have a similar
effect if offered by a person not in a position of authority" and ap-
parently left open the effect of a mere "moral inducement. ' 47 More-
over, on the facts presented, the finding of an improper inducement
suggests that the Court believed the Constitution required the same
broad definition of "inducement" that the mid and late nineteenth cen-
tury English courts had applied.
Although the language used in the opinion implies that the decision
was based on constitutional grounds, the constitutional significance of
Bram is uncertain. The Court in several subsequent cases involving
challenges to admission of confessions in federal criminal trials did not
even refer to a possible constitutional basis for the confession rule that
was applied.48 In Stein v. New York,49 the Court stated that Brain
represented only an exercise of the Court's supervisory power and was
"not a rock upon which to build constitutional doctrine. ''s( Although
this observation was made in the context of a discussion about
whether the erroneous admission of a confession always required re-
versal rather than in the context of an examination of the standard for
determining admissibility, the Court was correct in its conclusion that
it could properly regard its constitutional analysis of the admissibility
of confessions in cases appealed from federal trials as "mere dicta"
since there already existed a federal evidentiary requirement of volun-
tariness.
Supreme Court review of state decisions involving the admission of
46. Id. at 559.
47. See id. at 564.
48. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924); Perovich
v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907). But cf. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S.
303, 313-14 (1912) (rejecting fifth amendment argument that defendant's voluntary tes-
timony at preliminary hearing before United States Commissioner was inadmissible be-
cause defendant not advised that it might be used against him).
49. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
50. Id. at 191, n.35.
Vol. 1975:275]
Washington University Open Scholarship
290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
self-incriminating statements did not begin until 1936 when the Court
held that although the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
did not apply to the states, the due process clause nevertheless required
that state criminal convictions must not "offend some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." 51  This requirement was violated if compulsion by
torture was used to extort a confession that was the sole basis upon
which a conviction was obtained.5 2 Although the later decisions clearly
regarded the mere use in evidence of involuntary confessions as ab-
horrent to the constitutional mandate,53 the early cases seemed to find
such confessions improperly admitted only when the conviction rested
upon them.54  The significance of this change is unclear. By regard-
ing the conviction as resting entirely or largely upon the defective con-
fession, however, the Court could more easily accommodate confession
cases within the then-prevailing constitutional doctrine, which had not
yet become enamoured of the exclusionary rule as a device for enforc-
ing constitutional standards of conduct. It seems likely that the later
change reflected a belief that using, as well as obtaining, the confession
violated important values. This belief was not, however, articulated.15
In any event, the decisions soon embraced a constitutional rule that the
use of an "involuntary" confession in a state criminal trial would-per-
haps in all cases-invalidate the resulting conviction."0 It has been pri-
51. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
52. See id. at 285-87.
53. See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 (1967); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949); Aschraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
54. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940) ("To permit human
lives to be forfeited upon confessions thus obtained would make of the constitutional
requirement of due process of law a meaningless symbol"); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 286 (1936) ("It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to
the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and
the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction ... was a clear vio-
lation of due process").
55. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944):
A coerced confession is offensive to basic standards of justice, not because the
victim has a legal grievance against the police, but because declarations pro-
cured by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt.
This statement again begs the question. Why will a civilized society not infer guilt from
a confession induced by torture? Because the inference is likely to be inaccurate? Be.
cause drawing such inferences will encourage law enforcement investigators to engage
in torture in the future? Or because the drawing of the inference will itself again vio-
late the defendant's dignity, a dignity that has already suffered at the hands of the law?
56. See generally Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in
the U.. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 35 (1962).
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madly in the context of these decisions involving state convictions that
the voluntariness rule has evolved. 57
This development of the voluntariness rule has had two interrelated
facets. First, there has been an expansion of the kinds of situations
covered by the doctrine. Thus the condemnation of physical brutality
in the initial decisions 8 was followed by an invalidation of statements
obtained by psychological coercion 9 and ultimately by a prohibition
against use of any confession obtained while the defendant's "will
[was] overborne."60 Second, there has been a corresponding expan-
sion of the rationale for the exclusion of statements under the rule.
Initially, the expressed rationale for exclusion was the potential unre-
liability of the statements."' The Court, however, soon acknowledged
that factors other than potential unreliability were at issue and justified
the expanded application of the rule upon the basis of those factors."'
But the failure to define precisely these "other" factors has been a
major cause of our legal doctrine's continuing inadequacy in dealing
effectively with ignorance, mistake, and reliance.63
Of course, the existence of this expanding constitutional rule did not
foreclose the application of evidentiary requirements of voluntariness,
which continued to be available as limitations upon the admissibility
of incriminating statements. The interrelationship between local evi-
dentiary requirements and the constitutional rule, however, was never
made explicit. Indeed, state courts often regarded the two as identical.
In Lisenba v. California,64 the Supreme Court recognized that the ex-
istence of the constitutional requirement did not foreclose the states
from adopting, as a matter of local evidence law, varying tests for deter-
57. It might be expected that the Brain test, arising directly from the fifth amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, would be more stringent than the
Brown standard applicable to the states, since the latter lacked the fifth amendment
foundation and rested only upon the fourteenth amendments due process standard. But
by 1966, the Court was able to state: "The decisions of this Court have guaranteed the
same procedural protection for the defendant whether his confession was used in a fed-
eral or state court." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 n.33 (1966).
58. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
59. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
60. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
61. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
62. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) ("a complex of
values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of
convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary").
63. See text following note 93 infra.
64. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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mining the admissibility of confessions. Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that the two doctrines were based upon different policy con-
siderations that might lead to differences in their substances:
The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was volun-
tarily made is to exclude false evidence.... The aim of the require-
ment of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but
to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true
or false. The criteria for decision of that question may differ from those
appertaining to the State's rule as to the admissibility of a confession.05
Nevertheless, the decisions of the Supreme Court, the state courts, and
the lower federal courts failed to distinguish how-if at all-the criteria
differed in substance.
Similarly, the Court did not address the meaning of "fundamental
unfairness" as this phrase was used in the rationale for the due process
standard. It may have meant only that defendants had a right to have
their convictions rest upon evidence which, as a category, was reliable.
Involuntary confessions, then, would be inadmissible because as a group
they tended, more than other confessions, to be unreliable. Or, the
right to "fairness" may have meant the right to be free from coercive
police conduct that, as a general matter, created an unacceptable risk
of producing untrue confessions. To discourage such conduct, all in-
voluntary confessions would be excluded, whether particular confes-
sions could be proved accurate or not. 6 In the alternative, the lan-
guage may have meant that some value other than accuracy in trial
outcome underlay the constitutional standard. The decisions were of
little help, 'however, in determining what this value was-if in fact such
an independent consideration was operative at all. All of these inter-
pretations of the "fairness" language are consistent with the Court's
holding in Rogers v. Richmond 7 that the admissibility of a particular
confession had to be determined by a standard of "voluntariness"
65. Id. at 236.
66. See Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on lnbau
and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RuTGERs L. Rnv. 728, 753-59
(1963). Professor Kamisar noted this distinction and concluded that the Court was ap-
plying both concepts. Some confessions, he asserted, have been held inadmissible be-
cause, on the facts, there was substantial doubt about their reliability; others were held
inadmissible because although there was little doubt about the reliability of the confession
at issue, the tactics used in obtaining it created a significant risk that unreliable state-
ments would be obtained in other cases if such tactics were repeated.
67. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518
(1963) (error to tell jurors they might consider involuntary confession if it was corrobo-
rated).
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rather than a standard taking into account the probable truth or falsity
of the statement. 5
This ambiguity of rationale was easily hidden in the kind of analy-
sis the voluntariness test came to require. As Justice Frankfurter sum-
marized in Culombe v. Connecticut:69
No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interroga-
tion has been evolved ....
Each of [the] factors, in company with all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances . . . is relevant. The ultimate test remains that which has
been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two
hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . . If
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determi-
nation critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
But making "everything" relevant-and nothing necessarily determina-
tive-also eliminated the necessity for specific discussion of the legal
effect of single factors. Relieved from the necessity of addressing the
significance of each factor, the Court tended to explain its results in
the broad, often meaningless, "overbearing of the will" or the "totality
of the circumstances" language. This, of course, greatly reduced the
pressure to explain specifically why particular characteristics of a case
were significant and thus facilitated avoidance of what would un-
doubtedly have been difficult analyses.
The state courts continued to struggle with the question of what
representations invalidated a statement and continued to reject attacks
based on a defendant's ignorance or mistake about factual material,
even if the mistake was due to intentional deception by law enforce-
ment agents.70 Some courts purported to apply a requirement that,
68. Commentators have disagreed on the extent to which the Court actually com-
mitted itself to the proposition that a confession might be involuntary for reasons unre-
lated to either the reliability of the specific confession at issue or the potential reliability
of other confessions obtained under similar circumstances. Compare Paulsen, The Four-
teenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. RFv. 411, 417 (1954) (Court had,
by 1954, already gone beyond protecting interests in accuracy), with Kamisar, supra note
66, at 754-55. Professor Kamisar was convinced that the Court would hold a confession
inadmissible solely on the basis of sufficiently offensive police misconduct even if there
was no likelihood of false confession under the circumstances. He believed, however,
that the Court's cases could all be read as resting upon the danger perceived by the Court
that the particular police conduct created an unacceptable risk of stimulating false con-
fessions, even if there was little or no doubt about the accuracy of the confessions in
the specific cases before the Court.
69. 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) (footnote omitted).
70. See cases cited note 122 infra.
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in order for the statement to be inadmissible, the promise, representa-
tion, or deception had to be likely to induce an inaccurate confession.71
But, in general, the state courts treated the matter as one of state evi-
dence law rather than one of federal constitutional law. When cases
were cited, they were almost inevitably state cases; little or no refer-
ence was made to United States Supreme Court decisions. 72
C. The "Objective" Standards: McNabb-Mallory and Miranda
As the Court began to deal with more subtle aspects of official inter-
rogation and confessions, and as it became more concerned with pro-
tecting the suspect's interests, a definite dissatisfaction with the volun-
tariness test developed. This dissatisfaction seemed to have two
facets: the first, one of administration, and the second, one of sub-
stance. Because the voluntariness test required courts to reach a con-
clusion based upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession, it provided a poor vehicle for developing
specific legal rules for police interrogators to follow. As long as police
conduct was grossly inappropriate, there was little problem; the early
cases involving beatings and clearly indicated that such physical mis-
treatment was improper. But when the Court began considering the
impact of less blatant conduct upon defendants, the decisions provided
little guidance on how close interrogators could come to "the line"
without crossing it.
This dearth of clear principles became more apparent in Culombe
v. Connecticut when Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, made
an obvious attempt to consolidate and clarify the law of voluntariness.7 3
Chief Justice Warren, concurring, pointed out the ineffectiveness of the
effort:
The opinion which announces the judgment of the Court in the instant
case. . . is in the nature of an advisory opinion, for it attempts to re-
solve with finality many difficult problems which are at best only tan-
gentially involved here. The opinion was unquestionably written with
the intention of clarifying these problems and of establishing a set of
principles which could be easily applied in any coerced-confession situa-
tion. However, it is doubtful that such will be the result, for while three
members of the Court agree to the general principles enunciated by the
71. See cases cited notes 119 (promises and representations) & 124 (deception)
infra.
72. See cases cited note 117 infra.
73. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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opinion, they construe those principles as requiring a result in this case
exactly the opposite from that reached by the author of the opinion.
This being true, it cannot be assumed that the lower courts and law en-
forcement agencies will receive better guidance from the treatise for
which this case seems to have provided a vehicle.74
In addition to its dissatisfaction with the lack of guidance provided
by the voluntariness principles, the Court was also displeased with the
manner in which the doctrine was being judicially administered. The
need for the Court continually to accept a substantial number of con-
fession cases in order to reverse state and lower federal court decisions
imposed a heavy burden. Undoubtedly, this state of affairs was frus-
trating for the Court, especially since it indicated that the lower courts
were not following the Court's lead in applying the test with vigor.75
Yet the nature of the doctrine was such that the Court could do little
to change the situation by exercising its appellate supervision beyond
deciding cases in ways re-indicating the Court's view that the rule
should be applied with a different "attitude." Thus the rule imposed
a significant administrative burden on the Court, but provided an in-
adequate return for the expenditure of time and effort required to dis-
charge this burden.
With respect to the second facet of the Court's dissatisfaction-that
of substance-the Court apparently perceived a change in the under-
lying problem; its concern was no longer focused upon blatant police
misconduct, such as physical violence. As the discussion in Miranda
v. Arizona76 made clear, the Court was concerned with more subtle
influences, such as what it perceived as the inherently coercive nature
of any custodial interrogation. Much of the Court's agitation related
to the manipulation of the subject's emotional condition-probably
what the Court meant by "psychological coercion," a phrase often used
in its decisions. These were not the only dangers, however, that the
Court recognized as deserving its solicitude. Noting that law enforce-
ment manuals suggested that subjects be offered "legal excuses" for
the crime, the Court in Miranda seemed apprehensive that the decision
74. 367 U.S. at 636.
75. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (confession held invol-
untary although counsel for petitioner had not raised issue, suggesting Court's willingness
to apply rule in cases where counsel involved believed point not worth argument). See
generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MicH. L. Rnv. 59, 95-
104 (1966).
76. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to confess would be made under a mistaken view of the law governing
the facts admitted.77  Deceptive police practices, such as having ficti-
tious witnesses identify the suspect, were noted with obvious displeas-
ure,78 although significantly, the Court failed to identify the reason for
disapproval. Nevertheless, a thorough reading of the Miranda opinion
leaves little doubt that the Court was offended at the prospect of a sus-
pect's making the decision to confess on the basis of an inaccurate
awareness of the facts relating to his case (including the availability
of witnesses who could identify him as the perpetrator) and of the law
determining the criminal significance of these facts. These problems
would exist despite any awareness the suspect might have of his ab-
stract legal right to be free from illegal coercion designed to compel
him to make an incriminating statement.
The voluntariness test was an inadequate vehicle for dealing with
these dangers because the decisions rested on the combined effect of
several or more of them and therefore failed to address the legal effect
of each danger individually. Not only was the voluntariness test ap-
parently ineffective in meeting those problems at which it had tradi-
tionally been aimed, but in addition, it appeared even less able to deal
with the major concerns that had subsequently developed in the con-
fession area.
With respect to federal law enforcement, the Court's response came
in 1943 in McNabb v. United States.70 Exercising its supervisory
powers, the Court held that a statement should be excluded if it was
obtained during an "unnecessary delay" in presenting an arrested de-
fendant before a magistrate. In Mallory v. United States,0 the Court
confirmed that this "unnecessary delay" included delay for purposes of
conducting interrogation. These decisions reflected a basic shift in ap-
proach to the problem of custodial interrogation. Abandoning its ex-
clusive reliance upon case-by-case analysis to determine the voluntari-
ness of statements made during custodial interrogation, the Court sub-
stituted a blanket rule, which it viewed as greatly reducing the oppor-
tunity for custodial interrogation. Following this shift in approach to
federal law enforcement-whether because this McNabb-Mallory doc-
trine was effective in practice or whether for other reasons-the volun-
77. See id. at 451, 455.
78. Id. at 453.
79. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
80. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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tariness test in Supreme Court case law came to be used entirely as
a vehicle for reviewing state litigation.
Finally, in 1966,1 with regard to state law enforcement activity, the
Court took a step analogous to that taken in federal practice. The de-
cision, Miranda v. Arizona, undoubtedly reflected both the Court's dis-
satisfaction with the voluntariness test as a framework for reviewing
state use of confessions and the Court's desire to substitute a more effec-
tive and less burdensome approach to protecting those interests endan-
gered by custodial interrogation. In Miranda, the Court established
that defendants subjected to custodial interrogation had a right to have
a lawyer present during such interrogation and a right to be informed,
before any interrogation, of both this right to have a lawyer present
and the right to remain silent.82  This rule, like the McNabb-Mallory
rule, was considered to be objective and easy to apply and to reduce
greatly the opportunities for inappropriate interrogation.
It is not clear whether the Court contemplated that McNabb-Mal-
lory and Miranda would completely end the necessity for applying the
voluntariness rule to particular fact situations; 3 obviously, they have
81. In 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, the Court had found a constitu-
tional deficiency in the use of a confession obtained after the subject had been denied,
consultation with his attorney despite his specific requests to do so and the attorney's
vigorous attempts to gain access to the subject during the interrogation. Uncertainty
about the significance of this decision was minimized by the more definitive decision
in Miranda.
82. 384 U.S. at 444-45. Doctrinally, the Court also recognized that despite the ab-
sence of explicit legal authority stating that the police could not compel self-incrimina-
tory answers during a period of custodial interrogation, the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination was infringed by coercive police interrogation tac-
tics. Id. at 458-66. But it is unlikely that this doctrinal development had any impact
upon the Court's holding; consider in this regard the insignificance of the doctrinal basis
for the voluntariness rules discussed in note 57 supra.
83. The confusion is best illustrated by those cases holding that a waiver of the
Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver of the right to prompt presentation before a
magistrate. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pettyjohn
v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970).
Contra, United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
412 U.S. 205 (1973). See also United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Lopez, 450 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
931 (1972) (per curiam). Waiver, as it is used in these decisions, cannot be defined
as a knowing relinquishment of a right, since there is nothing in the Miranda warnings
or the required waiver that tends in any way to assure that the subject is aware of his
right to prompt presentation. If, however, the Miranda rights are viewed as a means
of dealing with the same problem as prompt presentation, it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that compliance with Miranda makes compliance with prompt presentation require-
ments unnecessary. This argument, of course, ignores the other functions served by the
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not. Under Miranda, both the right to the presence of counsel and the
right to remain silent are "waivable," although the waiver must be
"voluntary." 4 Experience has shown that in the vast majority of cases
in which seif-incriminating statements have been made during custodial
interrogation, no lawyer has been present;85 therefore, a potential ques-
tion can exist as to the validity of both the waiver of the right to counsel
and the waiver of the right to remain silent.
Moreover, several other developments in confession law have also
contributed to the increasing importance of the voluntariness determi-
nation. In Harris v. New York,"" the Court held that a statement ob-
tained without compliance with Miranda could nevertheless be used for
impeachment purposes if the defendant took the stand at trial. The
Court noted, however, that no question concerning the "trustworthi-
ness" of the statement was raised, 7 thus suggesting that if a statement
were inadmissible into evidence for a reason based on unreliability, it
would be inadmissible for impeachment as well. Involuntariness, of
course, has traditionally been regarded as suggesting unreliability.
Thus in any case in which there has arguably been noncompliance
with Miranda and the defendant has taken the stand at trial, voluntari-
requirement of prompt presentation, including pretrial release, formal notice of the
charges, Miranda warnings being given by a person who may not be intimately inte-
grated into the law enforcement agency having custody of the subject, and perhaps most
important, concrete demonstration that the police recognize legal limitations upon their
right or ability to keep the subject in custody. Whether these functions are sufficiently
important to justify punishing noncompliance with the prompt presentation requirement
by applying the exclusionary rule governing self-incriminating statements, or whether the
exclusionary rule is even an appropriate device to enforce such compliance, may be ques-
tioned. But the demonstrable fact that waiver doctrine can be distorted by courts to
avoid facing these issues (and the underlying problem of the relationship between
Miranda and the right to prompt presentation) suggests that the waiver doctrine is insuf-
ficiently defined in existing law.
The lower courts have also been somewhat confused about the relationship between
the old voluntariness test and Miranda. For an example of such a case, see Common-
wealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 322 A.2d 119 (1974), in which the court analyzed a chal.
lenge based on coercion and deception as raising only an involuntariness claim. Ignor-
ing the requirement that a waiver be voluntary, the court commented, "There is no claim
that the confession is inadmissible under. . . Miranda v. Arizona. . . ." Id. at - n.7,
322 A.2d at 124 n.7. Compare this approach with the court's analysis of deception
as raising an issue regarding the "knowing" nature of a waiver of Miranda rights. Id.
at-, 322 A.2d at 126-27.
84. 384 U.S. at 444, 475-76.
85. See generally Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
86. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
87. Id. at 224.
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ness questions are likely to be raised if statements by the defendant
are admitted for impeachment 8s In addition, federal legislation en-
acted in 196889-and copied by some state legislatures 0--purports to
reinstate voluntariness as the sole test for the admissibility of a self-
incriminating statement. This legislation is, of course, of doubtful con-
stitutionality, but unless and until it is definitively struck down, it makes
voluntariness in the traditional sense a potential issue in any confession
case.
In summary, then, American courts early adopted the common law
voluntariness rule as an evidentiary requirement for the admissibility
of confessions. To some extent, the constitutional requirement of due
process incorporated the substance of this rule, but the case law is un-
clear in showing to what extent the nuances of common law rule-
especially those of concern here-were raised to constitutional level.
The relationship of the fifth amendment voluntariness requirement, ap-
plied to the federal government, and the general due process standard,
applied to the states, further complicated the doctrinal matter. After
lengthy experience with the voluntariness standard-or standards-as
the major constitutional doctrine for prohibiting perceived impropriety
in interrogation, the Supreme Court found both substantive and pro-
cedural deficiencies in it. The Court apparently intended largely to
88. This proposition has been recognized by a number of courts. See, e.g., People
v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 209, 524 P.2d 844, 847, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1974) ("the
determination of voluntariness is still necessary under Harris when the statement is of-
fered for impeachment"); State v. Joseph, 10 Wash. App. 827, 520 P.2d 635 (1974)
(hearing to determine voluntariness of statement still required after Harris before state-
ment could be admitted for impeachment purposes); Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553,
219 N.W.2d 363 (1974) (remanding for determination of self-incriminating statement
admitted for impeachment); cf. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974) (if
defendant makes substantial claim that the witness' statement offered to impeach witness
was coerced, government must prove lack of coercion by preponderance of evidence).
Much of the dispute has been over the procedure that must be followed in such cases.
Specifically, courts are split on the necessity of conducting a preliminary inquiry into
the voluntariness of statements offered for impeachment purposes. Compare State v.
Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973) (no error in per-
mitting use of statement for impeachment without first determining voluntariness) and
State v. Brice, 17 N.C. App. 189, 193 S.E.2d 299 (1972), cert. denied, 283 N.C. 258,
195 S.E.2d 690 (1973) (lack of voluntariness inquiry before use of statements for im-
peachment did not make conviction defective), with Upchurch v. State, supra (defendant
had right to statutory hearing on voluntariness of statement before it was admitted for
impeachment) and State v. Joseph, supra (same).
89. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970)).
90. See, e.g., Auiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1599 (Supp. Pamphlet 1973).
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replace the voluntariness standard with objective requirements that did
not deal directly with interrogation techniques or the subjective re-
sponse of a defendant to such actions but instead provided procedural
protections which the Court was willing to rely upon to deal with the
underlying problem. Because these protections can be readily waived,
however, they have been only minimally implemented, and the require-
ment that the waiver be "voluntary" suggests that many cases of chal-
lenged waiver will require application of the very doctrine the recent
decisions intended to retire.
This doctrine of voluntariness has been the traditional vehicle for
consideration of ignorance, mistake, and expectation of benefit in the
law of confessions. Because of the confused evolution of the doctrine
from a matter of common law evidence law to several federal and con-
stitutional rules, the extent to which contemporary confession law sim-
ply restates traditional common law notions is not clear-a problem ad-
dressed in the next section. But the history of confession law leaves
little doubt that developing constitutional doctrine largely accepted the
common law approach to these matters without carefully examining the
competing considerations that bear on the issues and, of course, without
attempting as effective an accommodation of those interests as possible.
II. THE RELEVANCE TO "VOLUNTARINESS" OF IGNORANCE,
MISTAKE, AND RELIANCE ON EXPECTATIONS
It is clear that under current law the doctrine of "voluntariness" is
the major vehicle for determining the legal status of a self-incriminating
statement, whether the specific issue posed is the adequacy of the
waiver of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination or the ade-
quacy of the waiver of the procedural incidents of that right, such as
the presence of counsel during interrogation. To understand the role
of ignorance, mistake, and reliance in current confession law, then, it
is necessary to trace the significance given to these factors in the de-
velopment of voluntariness, first as a standard for determining the con-
stitutional admissibility of a statement, and second as a standard for
judging the validity of a waiver of the Miranda rights.
A. Pre-Miranda Voluntariness
Brain v. United States9 may be read as adopting a liberal interpre-
tation of the inducement rule as a matter of constitutional law, but the
91. See text accompanying notes 35-47 supra.
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significance of the decision is far from clear. Despite the language
used by the Court, there has been substantial doubt expressed whether
the decision must-or should, if flexibility exists-be regarded as a
constitutional rule. 2 Further, it is unclear to what extent the decision
resulted solely from the inducement involved, since the facts also evi-
denced the sort of pressure that might invalidate the statement under
the "totality of the circumstances" approach. 3  Unfortunately, the
Court has not since spoken to the significance of promises that a tem-
poral benefit related to the anticipated prosecution will flow from the
making of a self-incriminating statement; thus Brain remains the sole
depository of the law on this problem.
Similarly, the case law subsequent to Brain is of relatively little help
in regard to other single factors. This circumstance is largely the result
of the necessity of determining the "voluntariness" of a statement on
the "totality of the circumstances." Such an analysis makes it difficult
to ascertain the legal significance of each of the factors involved, even
if it is clear that the factors at issue were among the "circumstances"
which were "totaled" to show "involuntariness." The early cases ex-
hibit ambiguity even concerning the necessity that a confessing defend-
ant be aware of his legal right to decline to make an incriminating
statement. In Wilson v. United States,9 4 decided in 1896, the Court
held a statement admissible although no warning of the right to decline
to make a statement had been given. The Court noted that the de-
fendant had not testified that he was unaware of his right to remain
silent, but did not comment on the legal effect such evidence would
have had.' 5 An identical analysis was applied in Powers v. United
States,"6 decided in 1912, when the defendant's argument was unques-
tionably one of constitutional inadmissibility. The implication, of
course, was that "voluntariness" as a constitutional standard requires
awareness of the legal right to remain silent, but the defendant bears
the burden of at least coming forward with evidence establishing ignor-
ance of that right.9" In more recent cases, the Court has emphasized
characteristics of confessing defendants that suggest a high likelihood
92. In State v. Doyle, 147 La. 973, 996, 84 So. 315, 333 (1920), Brain was de-
scribed as "highly exceptional" and an "unsafe guide" for future decision.
93. See text accompanying notes 35, 41-45 supra.
94. 162U.S. 613 (1896).
95. Id. at 624.
96. 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912).
97. This was not, however, the interpretation given the pre-Miranda voluntariness
cases in a recent analysis by the Court. See text accompanying note 132 infra.
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that the persons were, or were not, aware of the legal right to remain
silent or of the factors or law necessary to decide whether to exercise
that right.98 But the cases do not expressly hold that if the facts estab-
lished unawareness of these matters, exclusion of a confession would
be required for that reason alone under the constitutional test.
This approach is best illustrated by Gallegos v. Colorado,90 in which
a fourteen-year-old boy had been convicted of murder, largely on the
basis of a formal confession signed after five days of detention by ju-
venile authorities. The facts, insofar as they suggested traditional coer-
cion, were unimpressive. The boy had been asked, along with his two
brothers, to sit in a police car with officers and discuss the crime; he
almost immediately made an oral confession and repeated it again the
next day. Although he was not placed in the "regular" juvenile pro-
gram during his detention, he ate and communicated with other youths.
His mother was not permitted to see him when she came to the facility
on one occasion, but the evidence indicated she would have been per-
mitted to visit him during regular visiting hours had she tried. There
was no sustained questioning, and before taking the written confession,
the officer advised the boy of his right to remain silent and to be
represented by counsel; but the boy specifically indicated that he did
not want an attorney.
In a four-to-three decision, however, the Court held the confession
involuntary on the "totality of the circumstances," stressing the boy's
youth, the failure of authorities to provide the parents with immediate
access to the boy, the failure to take the boy immediately before the
juvenile court, and the lack of advice from a lawyer or friend.100 The
discussion strongly suggests that the Court was influenced by what it
perceived as the high likelihood that the boy did not have sufficient
information and capacity to make a well-informed and soundly rea-
soned tactical choice whether or not to confess:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
98. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (defendant had no prior
experience with criminal law); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620-21, 625
(1961) (defendant was a mental defective of moron class); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 440 (1958) (fact that defendant had attended the first year of law school sug-
gested his confession was voluntary); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 70-71
(1949) (defendant was illiterate).
99. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
100. Id. at 55.
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only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences
of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his consti-
tutional rights.
* * * He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his
confession were without advice as to his rights-from someone con-
cerned with securing him those rights-and without the aid of more
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in
which he found himself.' 01
This discussion leaves little doubt that what the Court perceived to
be of great importance was the boy's lack of understanding of the fac-
tual, legal, and tactical implications of confessing versus declining to
confess. 102  But what explains the Court's unwillingness to promulgate
a specific rule that the absence of such understanding would always
render a statement "involuntary?" It seems most likely that the Court
was deterred by what it anticipated would be the frequent-and time-
consuming-litigation, the difficult burden that would be placed on
prosecutors who would regard proof of such understanding to be part
of the essential foundation for admission of a confession, and the ulti-
mate inability of the courts, in many cases, to arrive at a reasonably
reliable reconstruction of the subject's actual state of mind at the time
of the confession. On the facts of Gallegos, however, such a subjec-
tive, difficult, and costly inquiry could be avoided because there was
an objective characteristic of the boy-his youth-that could be relied
upon to establish a sufficiently high probability of lack of understand-
ing to justify a determination of involuntariness. Conceptually, lack
of knowledge has always been of vital, and perhaps essential, impor-
tance, but the flexibility of the voluntariness rule has been used to avoid
significant inquiry into the matter except where there was objective evi-
dence from which knowledge, or the lack of it, could be inferred. 10 3
101. Id. at 54.
102. See King, Developing a Future Constitutional Standard for Confessions, 8
WAYNE L. REv. 481 (1962). King saw the decision resting "almost solely upon the ac-
cused's lack of knowledge and appreciation of his constitutional rights" and argued that
the same analysis could be applied to cases involving adults. "From both the viewpoint
of logic and policy, the new standard should be extended to all cases involving lack of
knowledge or appreciation of rights." Id. at 487-88. King, however, underestimated the
Court's reluctance to require prosecutors routinely to delve into the depths of a defend-
ant's awareness as a prerequisite for obtaining admission of a confession.
103. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), the Court held involuntary a
confession given by a defendant who was clearly mentally ill. Although acknowledging
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In regard to inducements labeled as "collateral" under the eviden-
tiary rule because they consisted of benefits unrelated directly to the
outcome of the criminal prosecution itself, the Court's approach has
been inconsistent. In Lynumn v. Illinois,'"4 the determination of in-
voluntariness was influenced by evidence that the defendant, a woman,
had been told that if she did not cooperate, her children would be taken
from her. But in Stein v. New York,'0 5 decided ten years earlier, the
court held a confession admissible, relying upon the fact of the defend-
ant's having confessed after obtaining promises that his father would
be released from custody and his brother would not be considered to
have violated parole:
[T]he spectacle of [the subject] naming his own terms for [his] con-
fession, deciding for himself with whom he would negotiate, getting what
he wanted as a consideration for telling what he knew, reduces to ab-
surdity his present claim that he was coerced into confession. 10 6
Where affirmative police deception has affected the defendant's
conscious perspective of his situation, the Court has also floundered.
Several cases suggested that such deception is legally offensive, but left
considerable doubt about the effect of mere deception on voluntariness.
In Leyra v. Denno,10 7 police represented that they were providing de-
fendant with a physician to treat a painful sinus problem. In fact, the
physician was a psychiatrist skilled in hypnosis-and interrogation-
who questioned defendant for one and one-half hours. Although the
deception involving the doctor's purpose and professional specialty
seems to have been a factor in the determination of involuntariness,
the sustained nature of the interrogation, the promises of benefits, and
the skills of the interrogator also entered into the decision and may
alone be regarded as sufficient to support the finding. In Spano v.
New York,'s police caused an officer who was a long-time friend of
the defendant to urge confession and falsely to represent that the de-
fendant's refusal to confess placed the officer's job in jeopardy and
the possibility that the defendant had confessed during a lucid interval, id. at 208, the
Court apparently regarded the evidence of severe mental illness persuasive enough to
justify rejecting the possibility. Again, however, the Court was not dealing with the
awareness of a "normal" person, but rather the state of mind of a subject who was
agreed to have been distinctly "abnormal."
104. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
105. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
106. Id. at 186.
107. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
108. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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would cause hardship to the officer's pregnant wife and children. Also
contributing to "the totality of the situation,"' 9 however, were eight
hours of sustained interrogation by a number of skillful persons, a sub-
ject who was young, foreign-born, and without a prior police record,
and police refusal to permit the defendant to consult with an attorney
he had already retained.
Given these indications of disapproval of deception, the decision in
Frazier v. Cupp"' is surprising. Frazier had been arrested for a mur-
der and had been informed of his right to an attorney and that a state-
ment could be used against him. As the questioning began, the inter-
rogating officer falsely represented that the person with whom Frazier
had told police he had been on the night of the killing had been
brought in and had confessed. When the officer sympathetically sug-
gested that perhaps the victim had provoked the fight by making homo-
sexual advances, Frazier began to confess, but indicated a desire to
speak with an attorney before saying more; he was persuaded to con-
tinue, however. Because of the timing of the incident, Escobedo v.
Illinois"' applied to the case, but Miranda v. Arizona"12 did not." 3
Escobedo was held inapplicable because Frazier's request to consult an
attorney was not clear and unambiguous. Turning to voluntariness, the
Court stressed that partial warnings of constitutional rights were given
the defendant, the questioning was short (about one hour), and he was
"a mature individual of normal intelligence."" 4 Then, in one terse
sentence and without citing authority, the Court stated: "The fact that
the police misrepresented the statements that [Frazier's companion]
had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this other-
wise voluntary confession inadmissible." 1 5  There was no discussion
109. Id. at 323.
110. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Superficially, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961),
might be regarded as a deception case. During Rogers' interrogation, a police officer
falsely represented that Rogers' wife would also be brought in for questioning. The fatal
defect which the Court found in the admission of the confession was the trial judge's
reasoning that the "pretense" of bringing the wife to the station had no tendency to pro-
duce a false confession. Id. at 541. But properly read, Rogers is not a deception case.
The substance of the police action was to threaten coercion; see note 6 supra. The offi-
cer's lack of intention to carry out the threat was insignificant compared to his making
it.
111. 378 U.S. 478 (1964), discussed in note 81 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
113. The nonretroactivity of Miranda and Escobedo was determined in Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
114. 394 U.S. at 739.
115. Id.
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of what more would have been needed to render the statement inad-
missible or why the facts before the court were insufficient. No rea-
sons for giving deception, ignorance, or mistake any-or no-legal ef-
fect in this context were offered.
As observed above, the state and lower federal courts generally ac-
cepted the common law rule-including the position that a promise
of benefit would, as well as the position that a deception would not,
render a statement inadmissible-although there was a discernible ten-
dency to apply the exclusionary branch of the rule with less enthusiasm
than did the English courts."" Despite the development of the federal
due process doctrine, however, the state courts tended to apply volun-
tariness as if it were a matter of state law. In discussing those aspects
of voluntariness considered herein, state courts tended overwhelmingly
to cite prior state decisions rather than decisions of the Supreme
Court."
17
The state courts' approaches to the problem of promises of bene-
fits were inconsistent. Some continued to apply a requirement that the
promise be one tending to stimulate an unreliable confession, even af-
ter Rogers v. Richmond"18 appeared to render this an inappropriate
consideration in the determination of constitutional voluntariness; such
courts often found promises inadequate to invalidate the statements at
issue.1 9  Others-obviously hostile to the rule-simply held that com-
116. See text accompanying notes 23 supra.
117. See, e.g., State v. Brauner, 239 La. 651, 658-59, 119 So. 2d 497, 499-500 (1960);
State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C. 333, 337, 130 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1963). In Commonwealth
v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962), the court cited United States Supreme
Court decisions in regard to other considerations arguably bearing on voluntariness, but
made no such references in rejecting defendant's argument that deception invalidated his
statement. But cf. State v. Ely, 237 Ore. 329, 332, 390 P.2d 348, 349 (1964) ("our
own cases, as well as those decided in the federal courts" require exclusion of involun-
tary confessions).
118. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
119. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16, 21, 25 (Fla. 1958) (statement by dep-
uty that if defendant confessed "'it would be easier on you,' or 'the easiest way would
be to tell it'" did not invalidate statement because "[tihere is no clear showing that
the inducement... was of a nature calculated, under the circumstances, to induce a
confession irrespective of its truth or falsity"); Robinson v. State, 247 Miss. 609, 612,
613, 157 So. 2d 49, 50-51 (1963) (telling defendant that the police "had the deadwood,"
on him, that his companions had confessed, and "'the thing to do is to square yourself,
not only with [the police] but with the Man Upstairs, and if you don't do that, you
are not trying to help yourself" did not meet test) (emphasis original). In State v.
Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598 (1957), the court held inadmissible the statement
of defendant, charged with entering the home of the victim, assaulting her, and taking
money. An officer told defendant, "'More mercy is going to be granted to you by the
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munications to suspects did not constitute "direct" "promises" and
therefore found no need to limit otherwise the scope of the rule's appli-
cation. 120  But still other decisions applied the rule with relative vigor
and excluded statements made after communications that other courts
either would not have labeled as "promises" or "representations of
benefits" or, at most, would have labeled as promises or misrepresenta-
tions "not likely to induce an untrue statement."'121
In regard to deception by law enforcement officers, most lower
courts continued to hold that it did not render a statement inadmis-
authorities if you tell the truth."' Id. at 13, 85 N.W.2d at 600. Exclusion was required
because
it is perfectly clear that the language was sufficient to justify the accused in
a belief that if he confessed he would be given more lenient treatment, special
consideration by the prosecuting authorities and the court, than he would if he
denied his guilt and was found guilty in the eventual trial.
Id. at 18, 85 N.W.2d at 602-03. But there was no discussion of why this language would
induce an inaccurate statement, the criterion specifically adopted by the court. In
Fisher v. State, 379 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964), the defendant's confession was
also held inadmissible, but here the court carefully explained its reasoning. The defend-
ant was suspected of stealing five tires from the service station at which he worked, and
the owner had told defendant that if he admitted the theft, the owner would help pay
for the tires if they had been sold and would not call the police, press charges, or fire
the defendant. (The owner was also a minister.) The Court explained:
In concluding that.., promises made. . . were likely to cause appellant to
speak untruthfully, we point out that appellant had at least two prior convic-
tions on his record and would, it seems, be inclined to admit a crime he had
not committed which would not be prosecuted, rather than risk the loss of his
freedom for life if he were prosecuted. Also, in this regard, appellants job
was also in jeopardy had he not admitted the theft, whereas he had reason to
believe there was no danger in admitting it.
379 S.W.2d at 902-03.
120. See, e.g., Hargett v. State, 235 Ark. 189, 190-91, 357 S.W.2d 533, 534 (1962)
(officer's statement to defendant that "'I would help him all I could"' was not made
conditional upon giving of statement and, although "[tlhe issue is not free from diffi-
culty," would not invalidate statement); Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1962),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 869 (1963) (statement by police officer that only way to avoid
death penalty would be by making a statement did not "alone" invalidate statement);
People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 381, 202 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 961 (1965) (officer's statement to defendant that "'ilt would go easier for him
in court if he made a statement'" was not a direct promise of leniency and did not in-
validate statement).
121. See, e.g., State v. Brauner, 239 La. 651, 119 So. 2d 497 (1960) (police proposal
that if defendant showed them where marijuana was and identified source, they would
see about making it easier on him, speak to the district attorney, and probably get him
a suspended sentence rendered defendant's confessions involuntary and therefore inad-
missible under code provision); State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C. 333, 130 S.E.2d 641 (1963)
(sheriff's statement that if defendant was involved in crime, the sheriff "'would certainly
try to help him'" rendered statement inadmissible); State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321
P.2d 202 (1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877 (1959) (statement by police chief that
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sible,122 although there were occasional expressions of condemnation,
and such deception was sometimes regarded as a "factor" in the volun-
tariness inquiry. 2  Some courts-again despite Rogers-continued to
require that the deception be one tending to induce an untrue state-
ment and to find-often without explanation-that the deception at is-
sue was not of that sort. 24
under state law a murderer who confessed could not be given death penalty was direct
inducement and required exclusion); State v. Ely, 237 Ore. 329, 390 P.2d 348 (1964)
(where father of molested child, school superintendent, and principal of school where
defendant was employed all told defendant that if he made a statement they would not
prosecute, statement was invalid; defendant had been warned of right not to make state-
ment, told it could be used against him and in any case would end his teaching career
in state, and informed that there was no guarantee that someone else would not prose-
cute him).
122. See, e.g., State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
123. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955) (confronting defendant with three disguised police of-
ficers who identified him as driver of vehicle involved in robbery would not alone vitiate
confession, but it did aggravate lengthy, incommunicado interrogation and contributed
to finding of involuntariness); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727
(1962) (practice of having nonwitness represent himself as witness to crime and purport
to identify defendant as perpetrator emphatically disapproved, but held not to render
statement inadmissible).
124. In People v. Castello, 194 Cal. 595, 602, 229 P. 855, 857 (1924), the California
Supreme Court adopted the position that deception would not invalidate a confession "'if
the artifice or fraud employed was not calculated to procure an untrue statement.'" But
no error was found in use of a statement that followed police officers' false representa-
tion that they could introduce the defendant to persons who saw him steal the property
at issue; there was no discussion of why this failed to meet the criterion adopted. The
test was applied in People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 346 P.2d 764 (1959), cert. dis-
missed, 366 U.S. 207 (1961), where a statement was held admissible despite the police
officers' having the defendant's insurance agent interrogate defendant to obtain a self-
incriminating statement without revealing that the agent was acting on behalf of law en-
forcement officers. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), discussed in text accompany-
ing note 107 supra, was distinguished on the unexplained basis that Leyra involved
"mental coercion" while the case at bar did not. See also People v. Thompson, 133 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 15, 284 P.2d 39, 46 (1955) (representation by police that they had more
proof of defendant's participation in crime than they actually had did not render state-
ment inadmissible because "there is no indication that the attitude of the officers was
calculated to procure or did procure any untrue statement").
Other courts reached similar results, usually without helpful explanation. See State
v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 828, 28 N.W.2d 475, 479 (1947) (failure to inform defendant
that victim of assault had died did not render statement inadmissible because even decep-
tion does not invalidate statement if "means employed are not calculated to procure an
untrue statement"); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 273, 93 A.2d 691, 694,
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 959 (1953) (failure to tell defendant, who had removed rails from
railroad track, that his action had caused two deaths "manifestly was not designed or
calculated to obtain an untrue confession" and thus did not render statement inadmis-
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Two characteristics of the state and lower federal court cases stand
out. One is the inconsistency of approach and result; the other is the
failure to regard Rogers as precluding consideration during voluntari-
ness determinations of the tendency of a factor to induce untrue state-
ments. There are two apparent explanations for these characteristics.
One is that these courts continued-despite the Brain line of Supreme
Court decisions-to consider voluntariness a matter of state law in
which state tribunals were not bound to accept the approach of the Su-
preme Court. The other-and more likely-explanation is that al-
though a statement rendered involuntary by coercion was recognized
as offending federal constitutional standards, there was a general belief
that the federal voluntariness standard had not preempted the matters
of deception or promises or representations of benefit. Despite Brain
-or perhaps because of its ambiguous rationale-these considerations
continued to be regarded as part of local voluntariness law existing
independent of the federal constitutional standard.
The pre-Miranda voluntariness cases contain a number of weak-
nesses. Mechanically, they fail to identify specifically the legal effect
of factors such as deception, ignorance, and mistake, with the possible
exception of ignorance or mistake concerning the existence of the ab-
stract legal right to remain silent. Conceptually, they fail to distinguish
between the nature of the defendant's conscious awareness of the facts
and law pertaining to his situation and other factors-either character-
istics of the defendant himself or of his environment at the time of the
confession-that may influence his decision whether or not to confess.
This conceptual failure, in turn, has led to further confusion. Thus,
ignorance or mistake concerning the crime under investigation appear
to be relevant, but never controlling--even when ignorance or mistake
may be a significant factor in the subject's decision to confess. The
implication is that such ignorance or mistake would render a confession
involuntary if the decision to confess was also affected by other factors,
presumably those in the category of influences rather than awareness,
but would not if those improper influences were absent. This is ab-
surd. Whether confessions made in ignorance of certain matters
relevant to the subject's tactical best interests should be discouraged
or rejected when offered as evidence is a completely different question
sible, although defendant was facing unpleasant incarceration in southern jail and may
have preferred to undergo conviction and punishment for what he believed was minor
Pennsylvania offense in order to avoid jail term).
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from the appropriate approach to be taken with respect to the effect
of threats of unlawful violence, physical illness, or the lack of sleep
upon confessing subjects. There is no basis for attempting to inter-
relate the two matters as traditional voluntariness doctrine attempted
to do, and the effort to do so has simply obscured the need to address
specifically and directly such problems as ignorance, mistake, decep-
tion, expectation of benefit, and promises.
In summary, then, the Supreme Court in its pre-Miranda voluntari-
ness cases did not adequately address the legal significance of ignor-
ance, mistake, deceit, or reliance upon expectation of benefit. The
state and lower federal court analyses were little better and unquestion-
ably inconsistent. In fact, the entire doctrine of voluntariness arguably
contained little of value for either stimulating or guiding the structured
consideration of these issues that was clearly demanded.
B. Miranda and Following
After Miranda v. Arizona there are two situations in which the
voluntariness issue might arise. Unless an attorney is present during
interrogation, the defendant must have waived his right to the presence
of counsel. And, even if interrogation is appropriate-that is, if coun-
sel is present or there has been a valid waiver-it must be clear that
there has also been an adequate waiver of the right not to respond-
that is, of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. 125  The two waivers have not often been distinguished, with
the unfortunate result that there has sometimes been a failure to focus
directly on the critical point in the interrogation process.120  Within the
Miranda decision itself, the Court referred several times to the require-
ment that the waivers be "voluntary"' 27 or that the defendant have
125. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 n.44 (1966) (addressing the require-
ments for a waiver of the right to remain silent when an attorney is present and interro-
gation continues after the defendant asserts a desire to remain silent).
126. In Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane), the court
held that the signing of a written waiver form which purported to waive the right to
counsel as well as indicate a willingness to make a statement had "no legally compul-
sive effect." It is true, of course, that a waiver of the privilege may be withdrawn before
the maker incriminates himself, see Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1966), and
therefore a person signing the form cannot be compelled to make the promised state-
ment. To the extent, however, that signing the form permits police to interrogate with-
out the presence of counsel, it has a definite "legal" effect. Whether or not it is "com-
pulsive" is less clear, although the emphasis in Miranda upon the inherently coercive
nature of interrogation without counsel suggests that it should be so regarded.
127. 384 U.S. at 444, 476.
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"knowingly and intelligently"'128 waived his fights, thus indicating that
the phrases are interchangeable. But in the Court's short discussion
of the requirements for a "voluntary," "knowing," or "intelligent" wai-
ver, there is a suggestion that the Court may have altered the concept
of voluntariness: "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defend-
ant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." '29  If this was intended to
alter the general assumption that deceit would not make a waiver in-
valid, it also raises the possibility that ignorance or mistake caused by
factors other than intentional deception may now have greater legal ef-
fect than was previously the case.
Although the Court has not subsequently dealt with "voluntariness,"
"intelligence," or "knowledge" in the context of confessions, these con-
cepts were treated in the context of a waiver of the fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte.130  Unfortunately, the holding in that case perpetuated
and perhaps reinvigorated the traditional confusion surrounding "vol-
untariness" analysis. The Court defined the issue narrowly: whether
the prosecution, as part of its task of proving the validity of a consent
to search, must demonstrate that the subject was aware of a legal right
to refuse.1 ' After analyzing the pre-Miranda confession cases, the
Court concluded that:
[t]he significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them
turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion.
, * " In none of them did the Court rule that the Due Process Clause
required the prosecution to prove as part of its initial burden that the
defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer the questions that
were put. While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the
police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be
evaluated in assessing the "voluntariness" of an accused's responses,
they were not in and of themselves determinative.13 2
Turning to the situation before it, the Court stressed that defining "vol-
untariness" in the context of search and seizure, as in the confession
context, involved a fair accommodation of the competing considera-
tions.113  The Court then discussed a number of considerations that
128. Id. at 444, 475, 479.
129. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
130. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
131. Id. at 222-23.
132. Id. at 226-27.
133. Id. at 227, 229.
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militated against imposing a requirement of proof of awareness. First,
even where no probable cause exists, consent searches serve a valuable
and legitimate law enforcement purpose and are often to the ultimate
benefit of the person searched.13 4  Second, the difficulties of proving
a person's subjective understanding would make the burden on prose-
cutors a significant one. 135  Although this problem could be alleviated
by requiring a warning analogous to that required by Miranda in the
interrogation context, this would be "thoroughly impractical."' And
third, consent searches are generally conducted in situations not pre-
senting the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation that was signifi-
cant in Miranda.37
At this point, the Court turned to the task of reconciling its holding
with traditional waiver doctrine. Acknowledging that the standard of
Johnson v. Zerbst'38 (frequently applied to waiver of constitutional
rights) required awareness of the right given up, the Court observed
that this standard has been applied only to those constitutional rights
given a defendant to assure him a "fair"--apparently defined as ac-
curate-trial. 139  Miranda presented such a case and thus the Court
regarded meeting the Johnson standard there to be "a necessary pre-
requisite to a finding of a valid waiver.' 40  Since fourth amendment
rights are extended to protect the interest in privacy and not that of
a fair trial, however, the Court held the Johnson standard inapplicable
to the consent search situation. 14
The holding of Schneckloth is, of course, open to objection. First,
it settled little. The case held only that the prosecution has no burden
of proving awareness of the fourth amendment right and did not ad-
dress a defendant's right to come forward with evidence that he lacked
such awareness. Since awareness of the right is relevant to voluntari-
ness, apparently awareness--or the lack of it-may be proved, but the
case leaves consent search law in the same shape as confession law:
There is no basis for determining when, if ever, awareness must be es-
tablished or under what circumstances lack of awareness will invalidate
consent. Moreover, it is arguable that the Court grossly over-esti-
134. Id. at 228.
135. Id. at 230.
136. Id. at 231.
137. See id. at 232, 240.
138. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
139. 412 U.S. at 237.
140. Id. at 240.
141. Id. at 242.
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mated the difficulties prosecutors would experience in proving aware-
ness and the impracticalities involved in giving subjects a brief warning
prior to obtaining consent to search.
Nevertheless, the significance of the discussion for confession law is
apparent. The majority opinion regards Miranda as having established
an awareness requirement for waiver of-seemingly-both the right to
remain silent and its incidental right to have counsel present during po-
lice interrogation, a requirement not found in the constitutional volun-
tariness cases of the past. But many questions remain unanswered
about the things of which a defendant must be aware and what signifi-
cance, if any, the reasons for a lack of awareness may have. Is it suf-
ficient that a defendant is aware of the existence of an abstract legal
right to remain silent? Or, is it necessary that he be aware of some-
or all-of those matters that are obviously essential to apply properly
that knowledge to his own situation? If the latter, the defendant needs
to be aware of the facts surrounding the investigation, the law applic-
able to his own potential liability, the tactical advantages of consulta-
tion with an attorney and of immediate cooperation with authorities,
and perhaps more. To some extent, the discussion in Schneckloth
suggests a relatively broad definition of required awareness. In argu-
ing that it would not be possible to apply the Johnson standard to the
consent search situation, the Court stressed that under the Johnson test
"there must be examination into the knowing and understanding nature
of the waiver"'42 and that "in the informal, unstructured context of a
consent search,"' 43 a police officer could not make the type of exami-
nation required. Such an examination would not be necessary if all
that was required was an awareness of the abstract legal right. It
would be a reasonable requirement, however, if the Johnson standard
necessitated the defendant's having a reasonable awareness not only of
the legal right itself but also of the facts needed to make a reasonable
decision whether or how to exercise the right.
The lack of adequate guidance provided by the Supreme Court de-
cisions is obvious when one notes the lack of uniformity in the post-
Miranda state and lower federal court decisions that deal with ignor-
ance, mistake, and reliance. A particularly troublesome question is
whether a defendant must understand the warnings, which Miranda re-
quires be given him, in order for there to be an effective waiver. De-
142. Id. at 244.
143. Id. at 245.
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spite the language of Miranda (and the later discussion in Schneck-
loth), the courts have been unreceptive to arguments that waivers are
invalid when the defendant fails to understand his rights after being
given the Miranda warnings. 44 The only specific burdens imposed
upon the prosecution to show such awareness are the basic Miranda
requirements of proof of the warnings and proof of the usually mechani-
cal waiver. There have been several exceptions, however. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Frazier,45 held that "the
Government's burden of proof includes, in addition to the fact of such
a warning a showing-if the issue is raised-that the person warned
was capable of understanding it.' 4 6 On the facts of the case-includ-
ing expert testimony concerning the defendant's intelligence-the
court found evidence of ability to understand, but the court ignored
the possibility that the defendant had not actually understood the warn-
ings. Since the defendant had objected to the officer's notetaking, it
seems likely that, notwithstanding the warnings, he did not understand
that what he said could be used against him. Despite prodding by the
dissent,1 4r the majority of the court failed to consider the issue.
This issue of understanding was addressed, however, by the Ohio
Supreme Court in State v. Jones.4 8 Finding no adequate waiver where
the defendant had specifically refused to sign a written waiver form and
had refused to speak if anything was written down, the court formulated
a rule that would provide guidance for interrogating police officers:
[W]hen a defendant subsequently acts in such a way as to reasonably
alert an interrogating officer that the warnings given have been mis-
apprehended, -the officer must, before any further questioning, insure
144. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 483, 488 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 867 (1970) (defendant understood admissibility of oral statements); Klinger
v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 308 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969)
(waiver valid despite refusal to sign written waiver, defendant explaining that he did
not "'sign anything without a lawyer' "); State v. Carpenter, 211 Kan. 234, 505 P.2d
753 (1973) (waiver valid despite refusal to sign written form). Of course, the facts may
show a refusal to give a written statement for reasons other than a misunderstanding
of the warning. See Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422, -, 311 A.2d 572, 573
(1973) (waiver valid where defendant's remark that he would sign nothing but would
give "'a statement from me to you only"' and "'it will be your word against mine'
indicated that defendant knew statement would be admissible, but expected to prevail
on question of whether it was in fact made).
145. 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1974).
146. Id. at 896.
147. Id. at 900-01.
148. 37 Ohio St. 2d 21, 306 N.E.2d 409 (1974).
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that the defendant fully and correctly understands his Fifth Amendment
fights. 149
The court did not consider the situation in which a defendant may mis-
apprehend his rights but does not act in a manner that would alert law
enforcement personnel to his misapprehension. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that the court would be unreceptive in such a situation to an at-
tack upon his waiver. If this is correct, the position taken by the court
is one best viewed as condemning improper police conduct-that is,
interrogating a defendant when he is not aware of -his rights-rather
than one implementing a waiver standard-that is, requiring actual
awareness, whether or not objectively evidenced at the time.
The ineffectiveness of the current law as a guide for articulating ei-
ther the legal standard or the factual investigation required in particular
cases is demonstrated by the courts' treatment of the legal effect of
various abnormalities. Some of these abnormalities may affect a sub-
ject's awareness of the facts and law relating to his condition or may
affect the manner in which he evaluates and decides to act on those
facts of which he is aware. There is general agreement that mental
illness or retardation is a factor relevant to the validity of Miranda wai-
vers. 150 The discussions often purport to define the issue as being
whether the defendant, by virtue of his condition, was unable to under-
stand the warnings"' or to appreciate fully the situation in which he
found himself' 52 and the effect of confessing. 1c 3 But the reported ap-
pellate decisions reveal an unwillingness to undertake a critical and
thorough examination of the real significance of these conditions. Ra-
ther, the courts invalidate a confession on the basis of psychological
149. Id. at 26-27, 306 N.E.2d at 412. Alternatively, such action by a defendant
might be regarded as an effort to invoke the right to be free from interrogation except
in the presence of an attorney. Cf. People v. McClendon, 48 Mich. App. 552, 210
N.W.2d 778 (1973) (defendant's refusal to sign written waiver form should have put
officer on notice that defendant may have been exercising his right to remain silent, and
further interrogation was improper in the absence of other evidence tending to establish
waiver).
150. See, e.g., Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973) (mental illness one factor
to be considered); State v. Basden, 19 N.C. CL App. 258, 198 S.E.2d 494 (1973) (sub-
normal mental capacity important factor but not controlling).
151. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 51 Ala. App. 387, 391, 286 So. 2d 62, 65-66 (Crim.
App. 1973).
152. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 627-29 (Me. 1972) (emphasis on con-
tact with reality).
153. See, e.g., id. at 629 (emphasis on awareness of and appreciation for "what was
involved and at stake"); Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389, 309 A.2d 384 (1973)
(emphasis on understanding the significance of statement).
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abnormality only if the defendant exhibited specific behavior making
it abundantly clear that he was virtually out of contact with reality at
the time of the statement.154
In regard to intoxication, there is disagreement about even the abstract
criteria. A number of courts purport to apply the old rule that intoxi-
cation short of "mania" has no effect upon the admissibility of a con-
fession.' 55 Others acknowledge that intoxication is a factor that must
be considered-along with everything else-but the opinions reveal lit-
tle insight into what specific effect the intoxication must be found to
have in order for the statement or the waiver of Miranda rights to be
defective.'55 Those courts that have specifically considered the requi-
site effect have split. Some apparently require that the intoxication
render a defendant unable to make a coherent statement of his activi-
ties.' 57 Others seem to demand that the defendant have been unable
to understand the factual content of his statement.' 8 Finally, a few
154. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 629 (Me. 1972) (although defendant
was nervous, withdrawn, depressed, needed minor tranquilizers, had been hospitalized in
past, and was subject to changes in mood, his statement admissible because "defendant
had always been fully in touch with reality, acted and spoke rationally and otherwise
showed by his conduct that he was fully aware of, and appreciated, the nature and
quality of what was involved and at stake"); Commonwealth v. Cannon, 453 Pa. 389,
309 A.2d 384 (1973) (although defendant was paranoid schizophrenic, statement admis-
sible since no evidence that this prevented him from understanding the significance of
the inculpating statement and no evidence that police took unfair advantage of this con-
dition). Cf. Lowery v. State, 51 Ala. App. 387, 389, 286 So. 2d 62, 64 (Crim. App.
1973) (where hysterical female defendant was taken to physician for an unidentified
"shot for her nerves" and was still crying one and one half hours later when she ad-
mitted the crime, there was inadequate evidence that she understood the warnings). In
Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 916-17 (Alas. 1973), the admission of a statement was
upheld despite testimony of a psychiatrist that the defendant was a paranoid schizo-
phrenic and that his confession was partly the result of his paranoid thought processes
which led him to believe he could "outsmart" authorities by phrasing his confession in
subjunctive terms. The court commented, "Where, as here, there is scanty evidence of
delusions or hallucinations at any particular time, or of a complete psychotic break with
reality, it becomes difficult to ascribe the confession to mental illness." Id. at 917 n.14.
1.55. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 49 Ala. App. 681, 275 So. 2d 360 (Crim. App. 1973);
State v. Logner, 266 N.C. 238, 243, 145 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1966) (defining mania as
"so drunk as to be unconscious of the meaning of his words"), cited with approval in
State v. McClure, 280 N.C. 288, 290, 185 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1972).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Arcediano, 371 F. Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1973) (intoxi-
cation only one factor to consider in determining voluntariness under Culombe test).
157. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 491 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973)
(confession made during state of drug or narcotic intoxication is admissible if "at the
time accused was capable of making a narrative of past events, or of stating his own
participation in the crime").
158. See, e.g., State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529, 201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973) (state-
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recognize that intoxication will render waiver of Miranda rights ineffec-
tive if, as a result of the intoxication, the subject failed to understand
the rights. 9  There is little or no support for the proposition that a
waiver is invalid if, because of intoxication, a subject failed to perceive
accurately his tactical situation or the facts to which his Miranda rights
applied. The appellate cases indicate an unwillingness to evaluate cri-
tically the effect of intoxication upon a defendant's awareness and a
tendency to hold statements inadmissible for reason of intoxication only
in the very exceptional cases in which the defendant's obvious condition
at the time of the confession leaves no doubt that he was totally out
of contact with reality. 60
Perhaps the unsatisfactoriness of the present doctrine governing in-
toxication is best illustrated by a recent decision of the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, Britt v. Commonwealth . 6' Faced with determining the
validity of a waiver of Miranda rights and the admissibility of a
self-incriminating statement of a defendant who had registered .22 per
cent blood alcohol content on a breathalizer test, the court concluded
that "'voluntariness' is too elusive a concept to be a satisfactory cri-
terion."' 16 2  Recognizing that reliability or trustworthiness of a state-
ment inadmissible only if defendant was so intoxicated that he did not realize what he
way saying).
159. See, e.g., People v. Dagge, 10 Ill. App. 3d 726, 295 N.E.2d 336 (1973) (intoxi-
cation a factor to be considered in determining whether defendant understood and
waived Miranda rights); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 582 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1006 (1972) (intoxication will invalidate waiver if defendant "was unaware of his
rights and unable to make an intelligent waiver").
160. Statements in the following cases were held admissible: United States v.
Arcediano, 371 F. Supp. 457 (D.NJ. 1974) (reliance upon defendant's refusal to speak
with local officers and conditions he imposed on willingness to speak to F.B.L agents);
State v. Clark, 110 Ariz. 242, 517 P.2d 1238 (1974) (defendant appeared to be able
to understand warnings and manufactured incorrect version of events); People v. Dagge,
10 I11. App. 3d 726, 295 N.E.2d 336 (1973) (reliance upon defendant's ability to stand
without assistance, weakness of odor on breath, and lack of slurred speech or bloodshot
eyes); State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (reliance upon fact de-
fendant's answers had corresponded to questions arresting officer asked); State v. Smith,
476 P.2d 802 (Ore. Ct. App. 1970) (defendant's memory of events, as proved by his
testimony of events of interrogation, overcame other evidence of extreme intoxication).
In comparison, the court in United States v. Guaydacan, 470 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1972),
refused to admit a confession given by defendant who appeared to be under the influence
of drugs and beer and who had to be picked up from the floor for the administration
of warnings. In addition, however, the officer had threatened to jail and charge the de-
fendant's entire family; it is thus unclear to what extent the outcome depended upon the
intoxication.
161. 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
162. Id. at 500.
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ment is irrelevant if "coercion" is alleged, the court nevertheless held
that the likelihood of a statement's accuracy is a vital factor in deter-
mining its admissibility when it has been challenged on grounds of voli-
tional incompetence or mental incapacity.' 63 The court then pro-
ceeded to adopt the view that a statement by an intoxicated subject
ig inadmissible only if the subject had hallucinations or had begun "'to
confabulate to compensate for his loss of memory,'" because only then
would the truth of the statement become suspect. 64  Despite the in-
numerable decisions on the subject, the court regarded itself as without
guidance from federal constitutional decisions and free to return to the
trustworthiness rationale as the basis for formulating a criterion.16
It is arguable that this reluctance on the part of many courts to deal
specifically with the effect of psychological abnormality and intoxica-
tion upon the awareness of a confessing suspect is due, at least in part,
to the difficulty that is anticipated in any such inquiry.' 06 In the case
of intoxication, at least, there is also a feeling that by becoming intoxi-
cated, a subject has rendered himself worthy of less judicial concern
than that to which he would be entitled under other circumstances.
Nevertheless, it appears that incorporation of the language and analy-
sis of the old voluntariness test into the Miranda waiver doctrine has
enabled-if not encouraged--courts to avoid addressing the legal effect
of certain characteristics of a confession situation and, instead, hide the
lack of analysis under a broad, but vague, totality of the circumstances
test for voluntariness.
"Where the issue concerns knowledge of matters other than the ab-
stract meaning of the warnings themselves, the courts have been even
more unreceptive to arguments that particular confessions should not
have been admitted. 16 7  In State v. Braun,0 8 for example, A and B
were arrested. A confessed and police told him that his confession
would be admissible against B if it was repeated in B's presence; this
was not correct. A and B were permitted to confer, and A told B that
163. Id. at 499.
164. Id. at 500.
165. Id.
166. See Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972)
(discussing difficulties of determining impact of intoxication upon a defendant).
167. See, e.g., Layton v. State, - Id. -, 301 N.E.2d 633 (1973) (the waiver before
qonfessing to assault was valid even if defendant was unaware of victim's death because
Miranda requires awareness only of the incident under investigation, not of the specific
consequences of the behavior).
168. 82 Wash. 2d 157, 509 P.2d 742 (1973) (en banc).
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he-A-intended to repeat the confession in B's presence and that it
would be admissible. B then waived his rights and made a statement.
In a confused discussion, the court upheld B's conviction, suggesting
that the misstatement of law had not influenced B, but also implying
that this sort of mistaken view of the law of evidence would not invali-
date a waiver even if the misstatement had an influence on the decision
to confess. 1 9 Although there is some evidence of general judicial dis-
comfort if a defendant has confessed in ignorance of a major fact
greatly affecting the seriousness of the acts admitted, apparently only
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically adopted a require-
ment that the defendant be told-if he is not already aware-of "the
general nature of the transaction giving rise to the charges."'170
Despite the language in Miranda, the state and lower federal courts
have generally continued to hold that mistake caused by affirmative po-
lice deception does not invalidate a waiver or the resulting confes-
sion. 17 1  Frequently, the courts rely on Frazier,172 with no recognition
that Miranda apparently altered the applicable test for determining the
effectiveness of a waiver.' 73  In many instances, the opinions evidence
both confusion concerning the appropriate criterion to apply and dis-
comfort with the results apparently required by existing doctrine.
169. Id. at 162-63, 509 P.2d at 745-46.
170. See Commonwealth v. Richman, - Pa. -, -, 320 A.2d 351, 355 (1974)
(waiver of right to counsel at lineup), citing Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114,
121, 259 A.2d 160, 163 (1969) (defendant who apparently remained in car during rob-
bery confessed while unaware that murder had been committed; waiver invalid because
"an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel is impossible where the
defendant has not been informed of the crime which is being investigated"). The signif-
icance of Collins as precedent had earlier been questioned. See Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 278 A.2d 895 (1971). Where the defendant is aware of the of-
fense under investigation, no police "warning" is required. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Boykin, 450 Pa. 25, 298 A.2d 258 (1972) (where defendant knew police were investi-
gating child's death, not necessary to tell her specific degree of crime suspected); Com-
monwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 297 A.2d 108 (1971) (defendant telephoned police
to tell them he had killed victim).
171. See, e.g., State v. Braun, 82 Wash. 2d 157, 509 P.2d 742 (1973). See also Hop-
kins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973) (alternative holding) (confession
admissible despite evidence that detective falsely told defendant that a participant in rob-
bery-murder had implicated him and detective's admission that she had led defendant
to believe that the state had more evidence than in fact it did); State v. Stubenrauch, 503
S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (alternative holding) (confession admissible even if
officer falsely told defendant that others had implicated him).
172. See text accompanying notes 110-115 supra.
173. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 311 A.2d 483 (1973); State v.
Stubenrauch, 503 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Com-
monwealth v. Jones14 is illustrative. The court was faced with the
admissibility of a statement given by Jones after an interrogating detec-
tive had contradicted Jones' exculpatory statement with a statement al-
legedly made by another suspect; in fact, no such other statement had
been made. First, the court acknowledged that "confessions resulting
from a subterfuge that is likely to produce an untrustworthy confes-
sion" must be excluded,' 5 but it did not make clear whether this is
a local evidentiary or a federal constitutional requirement. Without
explanation, the court declared it was unconvinced the deception at is-
sue was likely to cause an untrustworthy confession. 176  Then, citing
Spano'77 and Leyra,'1 8 the court commented that the Supreme Court
"has offered another rationale for invalidating confessions"-appar-
ently as a matter of due process-and stated firmly that "where the
subterfuge [used to obtain a confession] is so reprehensible as to
offend basic societal notions of fairness, the confession . . . should be
excluded."' 1 9 Without discussing what characteristics of deception
would render it "reprehensible," the court summarily concluded that
the deception in the case before it was not "so reprehensible as to in-
validate the confession as offensive to basic notions of fairness,"'180 cit-
ing Frazier. Finally, the court separated a third issue: "whether the
subterfuge employed by the police precluded the accused from making
a knowing and intelligent waiver" of fifth amendment rights under
Miranda.'8' Although carefully noting that it did not "condone de-
liberate misrepresentation of facts supplied to an accused at a time
when he must elect to waiver [sic] a Constitutional right," the court
concluded that even an intentional misrepresentation of the evidence
available would not "so distort the factual situation confronting [the
subject] as to render his waiver unknowing and unintelligent."'8x 2 This
conclusion followed from a distinction the court made between aware-
ness of the nature of the constitutional right being waived-which it
considered necessary for a valid waiver-and awareness of the amount
174. 457 Pa. 423, 322 A.2d 119 (1974).
175. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 126.
176. Id.
177. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
178. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
179. 457 Pa. at--, 322 A.2d at 126.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 127.
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of evidence against the accused-which apparently it did not consider
essential to waiver. 18 3  The court, however, cited no authority whatso-
ever for the distinction and did not attempt to defend it on grounds
of sound policy. Nor, for that matter, did the court direct its attention
to the Supreme Court's Miranda language that seemingly condemned
trickery in obtaining a waiver. 8 4  The discussion by the court, how-
ever, highlights the major defect of current confession doctrine gen-
erally-the ill-defined and perplexing relationship between the eviden-
tiary voluntariness test, the constitutional requirement of voluntariness,
and the waiver standard-as well as the defects, more particularly, of
the deception doctrine. While deception seems to be "relevant" to all
three standards, its specific relationsip to them is, at best, ambiguous.
In addition, the use of deception to obtain a self-incriminating state-
ment has caused the courts unquestionable discomfort; yet existing doc-
trine provides no adequate vehicle for concrete judicial expression of
this attitude.
With respect to the area of confession law dealing with reliance upon
expectation of benefit, the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. United
States,'85 has had a significant effect. By holding there to be no con-
stitutional defect in a guilty plea entered in response to a promise of
dispositional advantage, the Court effectively "legitimized" plea bar-
gaining. Although it cited Brain and apparently continued to regard
Brain as good law, the Court distinguished police interrogation
from the guilty plea situation: "Bram and its progeny did not hold that
the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissi-
pated by the presence and advice of counsel . . ... "I On the basis
of the protections available to a person pleading guilty and not avail-
able to one confessing without counsel, the Court reached a result dif-
ferent from that in Bram. But this treatment of Brain clearly raises
183. Id. at -, 322 A.2d at 126. The distinction is arguably inconsistent with the
Pennsylvania court's insistence that the subject be aware of the offense for which he
is being investigated. See note 170 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the court
regards a requirement that the suspect be informed of the crime under investigation as
one capable of delineation and understanding by law enforcement agencies, while a re-
quirement addressing the suspect's awareness of the nature and quality of the evidence
available to the police could not be transformed into easy-to-apply rules that law en-
forcement agencies might be expected to observe. But this reasoning would not, of
course, argue strongly against a rule prohibiting affirmative police deception with respect
to the evidence available.
184. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
185. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
186. Id. at 754.
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doubts that it has survived Miranda. If the provision of counsel pre-
cluded a promise of benefit from invalidating a guilty plea, does coun-
sel's presence during interrogation also preclude a promise made then
from invalidating a confession? If so, does the waiver of the right to
have counsel present have the same effect? If so, does this result hold
true even if the waiver itself was induced by the promise? If the last
query is answered affirmatively, the matter has become circular. The
promise is deprived of its traditional effect because the assistance of
counsel makes it unnecessary to regard promises of benefit with hos-
tility. Yet the same result is reached without counsel if the promise
has the effect of inducing the subject to waive the presence of counsel
-the very procedural protection that justifies giving legitimacy to
promises of dispositional advantage in the first place.
On the assumption that the promise doctrine is part of the voluntari-
ness test that determines the validity of a waiver under Miranda, most
state and lower federal courts have simply applied the traditional test 187
-with some indication of an increasing reluctance to find a "fatal"
promise.' 8 But several courts have seen more significant problems.
187. See, e.g., United States v. White, 493 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1974) (in "otherwise
non-coercive atmosphere," single remark by officer that it would be helpful if defendant
gave a statement was insufficient to invalidate statement); People v. Pineda, - Colo.
-, -, 513 P.2d 452, 453 (1973) (en bane) (comment of officer to defendant that "'it
would be easier for us to work on and also himself if he would tell us exactly what
had happened"' was an implied promise which rendered statement inadmissible); State
v. Watson, 82 N.M. 769, 770, 487 P.2d 197, 198 (Ct. App. 1971) (officer's observation
that "'we can go to trial with one state witness and one defendant or two defendants
.... [You can go ahead and talk to me here or [I] book you and I will go home "
was an implied promise of leniency and required exclusion of confession); Common-
wealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 573-74, 301 A.2d 651, 654 (1973) (officer's telling de-
fendant that he should confess "to 'make it light on himself'" and that he could "'quite
possibly make out better than the others'" if he confessed was one factor in decision
that on totality of circumstances, confession was result of "subtle but nonetheless power-
ful form of impermissible psychological coercion").
188. See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 290 Ala. 201, 275 So. 2d 634 (1973) (officer's com-
ment was only an exhortation to tell truth and did not make statement inadmissible
where officer said he could not promise defendant anything but that if the probation
officer asked if defendant had given a statement and defendant had done so, officer
would tell probation officer about it); State v. Millin, 286 So. 2d 36 (Fla. App. 1973)
(remark by officer that he could not promise anything but that he would let the judge
and jury know if defendant cooperated "did not amount to a promise of leniency, but
only that his cooperation would be made known" and did not require exclusion of state-
ment). Other cases have taken the position that the promise did not affect the decision
to confess. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 467 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1972) (even
if defendant was told that he could obtain release on own recognizance if he made state-
ment, trial court finding that this did not overbear his will was supported by the evi-
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In Pontow v. State,'5 9 the defendant waived his Miranda rights and dis-
cussed a possible plea bargain with the assistant district attorney. He
finally agreed to confess to a series of crimes in return for a commit-
ment to be charged with only one. After apparently undergoing a
change of heart, the defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the
confession. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in affirming the convic-
tion, acknowledged Brain, but asserted that the promise cases had
all involved coercive police practices in conjunction with the prom-
ises.' 90 In addition, plea bargaining had been approved both in the
Wisconsin court's own opinions and in those of the Supreme Court.
The question remains, however, of whether it is improper under any
circumstances for the police and prosecutor to engage in confession bar-
gaining with an unrepresented defendant ....
... [W]e think it inappropriate to lay down a rule that forbids the
prosecutor from discussing the disposition of charges with a defendant
who manifestly prefers to negotiate on his own behalf. The confession
bargain will be subjected to severe post hoc scrutiny.1 1
A promise made by a prosecutor during confession bargaining was a
factor to be considered in determining voluntariness and in deciding
whether the difficult burden that Miranda places upon a prosecutor
who offers a confession from an unrepresented defendant had been
met. 192
The Pontow court's analysis of precedent is clearly subject to criti-
cism. Although it is true that Bram itself involved facts arguably con-
stituting "coercion"' as well as a promise, the historical background and
subsequent application of the rule by other courts has left little doubt
that by traditional analysis, a promise alone-without coercive police
practices-is sufficient to render a statement invalid. But the court's
functional approach to the policy issue-whether, in the modern con-
fession bargaining process with existing procedural protections, there
is justification for condemning such negotiations between defendants
and law enforcement officials-is much more attractive. Of course,
dence); Smith v. State, 20 Md. App. 577, 591-92, 318 A.2d 568, 578 (1974), cert. de-
nied, 95 S. Ct. 828 (1975) (detective's observation that court might take into considera-
tion defendant's version that fire was accidental did not influence defendant's decision
to confess).
189. 58 Wis. 2d 135, 205 N.W.2d 775 (1973).
190. Id. at 138-39, 205 N.W.2d at 777.
191. Id. at 141-42, 205 N.W.2d at 778-79.
192. Id. at 143, 205 N.W.2d at 779.
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not all courts have seen the question -as posing this complex query.
For instance, in United States v. Springer,193 the Seventh Circuit held
admissible a confession given by the defendant after an F.B.I. agent
told him that the United States attorney and the court would know if
the defendant cooperated, but no promises could be made. The court,
suggesting that promises of leniency are now irrelevant, declared: "No
public policy should castigate a confession of crime merely because it
may have been prompted by the hope that cooperation might achieve
or increase the chances of a lenient sentence."'194 This position, of
course, is entirely inconsistent with the common law rule and the ap-
parent constitutional doctrine of Bram.
Probably the most articulate brief against the approach of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court is the decision in Grades v. Boles, 96 a pre-
Miranda case. There, as in Pontow, the defendant negotiated his own
plea-confession bargain, but apparently he was far less successful than
Pontow had been. Holding the resulting confession inadmissible, the
court commented, "In effect, what the State here seeks to condone is
a species of plea bargaining shorn of any of the essential safeguards
mandated for true plea bargaining." 96 The court then emphasized the
lack of either the presence of counsel or an effective waiver of counsel;
although after Miranda, giving the warnings will normally avoid this de-
ficiency, the prevalence of waivers results in there seldom being actual
assistance of counsel. In addition, the court noted that in the confes-
sion bargaining situation, a defendant is often forced to make a deci-
sion without an adequate opportunity to think the matter over. Finally,
the court pointed out that the dangers of a bargained-for confession
are greater than those of a plea. In a plea situation, there is protec-
tion afforded by the requirement of an open court hearing and the pos-
sibility under some circumstances, a plea may be withdrawn; a confes-
sion, however, is always prejudicial, even if subsequently disclaimed.19 7
In any event, it is clear that the promise of benefit rule presents
special problems in the modern context, where the rule must be recon-
ciled with both the Miranda right to counsel and the legitimacy of plea
bargaining. The existing case law, however, provides little guidance
for interrelating the three matters.'9 8
193. 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
194. Id. at 1347.
195. 398 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1968).
196. ld. at 413.
197. Id.
198. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) is disturbing evidence of the flexibil-
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IV. A NEEDED REDEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
As shown in the discussion above, confession doctrine has neither
provided certainty nor adequately identified or resolved the conflict-
ing considerations involved when a confession has been influenced by
ignorance, mistake, deception, or expectation of benefit. Miranda was
apparently intended to be the definitive decision in the area, but the
difficulties that state and lower federal courts have had in treating tra-
ditional, as well as new, problems after Miranda demonstrate the inef-
ficacy of its approach. The fundamental problem with Miranda, of
course, is that it avoided the substantive issues. Instead of dealing spe-
cifically with the legal effect of deception or promise, the Court chose
to sidestep the problems by providing a procedural incident to the un-
derlying constitutional right, apparently in the hope that involvement
of attorneys in the interrogation process would somehow stimualte solu-
tion of the problems.1 99 The result, however, was not actually to in-
ity remaining in confession law and the willingness of the Court to exercise this flexibil-
ity in a manner minimizing the value of the law as a guide for future conduct. Peti-
tioner had objected to testimony of a witness who had been located by means of infor-
mation obtained from the petitioner in violation of the Miranda requirements. Because
the Court found no violation of petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination, but only
violation of the procedural safeguards "associated with" that privilege, the Court as-
sumed that admissibility of the statement depended on an analysis different from that
required had a violation of the privilege itself been shown. Balancing the interests in.-
volved, the Court determined that the sum of the arguments in favor of admitting the
evidence in question outweighed the arguments for excluding it. This balance was
clearly affected by certain facts: arguably there had been minimal noncompliance with
Miranda, the statement was taken before Miranda was decided and therefore the non-
compliance was "understandable," and the statement itself was not used against the peti-
tioner. The decision strongly suggests that a case-by-case, balancing-of-the-interests test
is being used to determine admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of procedural
requirements related to-but not a basic part of-constitutional rights. Such an ap-
proach, of course, would have all of the deficiencies of the voluntariness test, deficiencies
which the objective Miranda test was apparently intended to cure. If this reading of
Tucker is correct, the law now contains the defects of both approaches and arguably
the benefits of neither.
199. The approach of the Court in Miranda enabled the authors of a leading text
on police interrogation techniques, which was extensively cited in Miranda to illustrate
the dangers of police interrogation, to comment in their subsequent second edition:
As we interpret... Miranda v. Arizona, all but a very few of the interroga-
tion tactics and techniques presented in our earlier publication are still valid
if used after the recently proscribed warnings have been given to the subject
under interrogation, and after he had waived his self-incrimination privilege
and his right to counsel. The Court's critical comments about the procedures
we advocated were, we believe, for the purpose of establishing the necessity for
the warnings rather than as a condemnation of the procedures themselves.
F. INBAU & J. REM, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFEssIONS at vii (2d ed. 1967).
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volve lawyers but rather to bring waiver of counsel problems into
prominence and thereby to repose traditional issues in a new context.
What are needed are specific and direct decisions considering the
effect that various circumstances surrounding the making of a confes-
sion have on the admissibility of that confession.200 Only some of those
circumstances will be addressed here, those related to ignorance, mis-
take, reliance on expectation of benefit, and deceit. But even in re-
gard to these, it will be necessary to identify carefully the ultimate or
long-term objectives so that the undertaking has direction, to investigate
fully all potential vehicles for accommodating the conflicting interests
so that accommodation can be achieved most effectively, and to identify
and evaluate all considerations relevant to the decisions so that the
decisions reflect as full an accommodation of all relevant factors as is
possible.
A. The Interrelationships of the Doctrines
In order for an approach to even a small area of confession law to
be coherent, the approach must first resolve the ambiguities existing
with respect to the interrelationships of the three relevant standards:
the evidentiary requirement of voluntariness, the traditional due proc-
ess standard, and the new "objective" Miranda rules. Only if the basic
structure of the doctrinal framework is clarified can there be any realis-
tic expectations that a rational rule will be developed.
The Miranda rights to counsel and silence and the requirement that
warnings of these rights be given to the subject are appropriately taken
as the benchmark. Unquestionably, a suspect should have a right to
remain silent, but it is not so clear which considerations should be pre-
vented from influencing his decision to exercise that right. Despite
disagreement on the requirements for waiver and whether further con-
trols over the interrogation process are needed, there seems little doubt
that emphasis should continue to be placed upon providing representa-
tion during interrogation, since there is a generally acknowledged need
for the assistance of counsel throughout the criminal justice system.
Under the Miranda scheme, two things may be waived: the proce-
dural incidents of the right to remain silent and the right itself. Un-
200. This, of course, is not a new insight. Other commentators have recognized the
unfortunate effect of traditional doctrine and have called for reform. See, e.g., Kamisar,
supra note 66, at 759 ('The real reasons for excluding confessions have too long been
obscured by traditional language. The time has come to unmask them and to build from
there").
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doubtedly, the waiver of the right to remain silent is related to the tra-
ditional voluntariness test. Miranda, then, has simply added the neces-
sity of inquiring into the validity of a waiver of the right to counsel.
In any particular case, there should be several inquiries: (1) Was
counsel present during interrogation? If not, was there a "voluntary"
waiver, as that phrase is used in the traditional voluntariness test and
as possibly modified by Miranda and subsequent developments? (2)
Was there a valid waiver of the privilege to remain silent during inter-
rogation, whether or not counsel was present? Both of these waivers
must be "voluntary" and "intelligent," but once these inquiries have
been made, there is neither need nor justification for another inquiry
under the label of "due process voluntariness." This inquiry has been
subsumed under those inquiries detailed above.201
Whether there has been a violation of a right to prompt presenta-
tion and whether that violation should or does demand exclusion of a
related self-incriminating statement is an independent inquiry.
Whether the inquiry should be made, and if so, how the standard
should be defined, is beyond the scope of this discussion. Neverthe-
less, it must be kept in mind that this area is distinguishable and that
its treatment demands analysis beyond that given above.202
Finally, the role of the common law evidentiary standard must be
determined. At one point, it may have been true that the evidentiary
rule took into account only factors that tended to indicate unreliability,
while the due process standard was broader and considered factors that
demanded condemnation for reasons unrelated to the likelihood that
they would produce inaccurate confessions. There has never been uni-
201. Fitting the inquiry required by Harris into this scheme is somewhat difficult,
because that case seems to assume a "voluntariness" test that is distinguishable from the
Miranda issues. See text accompanying notes 86 & 87 supra. But the two can be ac-
commodated if the inquiry required by Harris when a confession is offered for impeach-
ment involves the voluntariness of the waiver of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination, rather than the waiver of the right to representation. It is certainly argu-
able that involuntariness of the waiver of the privilege is more likely to indicate unrelia-
bility than is involuntariness of the waiver of the incidental procedural right to counsel.
In the alternative, Harris might be interpreted to require a showing that the statement
challenged is unreliable, rather than simply a showing that the statement is involuntary
under the traditional standard. In other words, it might be reasonable, for purposes of
the Harris inquiry, to abandon the prohibition against inquiring into the reliability of
the specific statement at issue, see text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra, and to direct
attention to whether or not the facts suggest that the specific statement offered is inac-
curate.
202. See note 83 supra.
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versal acceptance, however, of this distinction.203 Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to identify any significant difference between the state evidentiary
rules and the due process standard that can be attributed to this dif-
ference in function. Perhaps this distinction permits a variation in the
enthusiasm with which the test is applied. That is, state courts may
apply the evidentiary standard with greater, but not less, enthusiasm
than the federal courts apply the constitutional standards. But such
differences are simply not the stuff of which legal rules can be made
or with which legal rules can meaningfully work. Nor is there a
discernible difference in the factors taken into account by the federal
evidentiary rule and the state rules. For example, in applying the fed-
eral standard, the Supreme Court has not-except for Bram-shown
any inclination to give more weight than do state courts in applying
their evidentiary standards to deception that is offensive but creates no
danger of falsification or to promises of leniency that provide no incen-
tive to fabricate a statement.
On balance, the existence of two doctrines-the common law evi-
dentiary rule and the due process requirement-serves little or no pur-
pose; the two should be regarded as merged. 20 4  Thus inquiries
into the validity of the Miranda waivers should also eliminate the
necessity for any inquiry into the voluntariness of the statement un-
der local evidence law. States should not, of course, be barred from
adopting other rules relating to confessions and interrogation. But
these should be adopted as distinct and specific rules, not as an aspect
of a voluntariness test. A state should remain free, for example, to
adopt a rule that excludes confessions made during continued custody
violating a right to prompt presentation before a magistrate. This rule
should be a separate rule, however, to be applied in addition to-and
not as part of-the requirement that the Miranda waivers be "volun-
tary."
B. The Objectives to be Pursued
A fundamental difficulty with the law of confessions has been the
failure of courts and commentators to identify the underlying objec-
203. See text following note 64 supra.
204. The federal judiciary could not, of course, prevent the continued application of
local voluntariness tests by state courts. Implementation of this suggestion would re-
quire that state courts abandon their evidentiary rules in recognition of the practical,
if not doctrinal, preemption by Miranda. This, however, is not always recognized. See
note 83 supra.
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tives of limitations placed upon the manner in which confessions may
be obtained and used. Although the assurance of reliability20 5 is still
an objective, there can be no doubt that the underlying concern now
extends much further. On the other hand, there seems little merit to
the Miranda detractors' suggestion that the objective of current legal
doctrine is to eliminate confessions entirely from the criminal proc-
ess.2"' It is interesting that even the briefs in Miranda were of little
value in identifying objectives. The most sophisticated brief arguing
for additional limitations suggested that the Court's objective should
be the relatively traditional one of protecting subjects from "coercion,"
which was defined as creating the impression that "the police have a
right to an answer, and, indeed, to what the police regard as the 'cor-
rect' answer. '207 This is far too narrow a view.
Justice Frankfurter, in his extensive discussion in Culombe v. Con-
necticut, recognized the complexity of the problem when he identified
the divergent positions that must be accommodated with the volun-
tariness rule:
At [one] pole is a cluster of convictions each expressive, in a dif-
ferent manifestation, of the basic notion that the terrible engine of the
criminal law is not to be used to overreach individuals who stand help-
less against it. Among these are the notions that men are not to be im-
prisoned at the unfettered will of their prosecutors, nor subjected to
physical brutality by officials charged with the investigation of crime.
Cardinal among them, also, is the conviction, basic to our legal order,
that men are not to be exploited for the information necessary to con-
demn them before the law, that, in Hawkins' words, a prisoner is not
"to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction. '208
But Justice Frankfurter-and Hawkins-beg the question. When, and
why, is a person "exploited" for information to condemn him or, in
Hawkins' languge, made the "deluded instrument of his own convic-
tion"? Neither jurist addresses this question. Yet unless it is resolved,
a major policy basis and an important objective of the law of confes-
sions remains ambiguous.20 9
205. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
206. See Ervin, Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary
Solicitude for the Accused, 5 Am. CRim. L.Q. 125, 126 (1967).
207. Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 156,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
208. 367 U.S. at 581, quoting 2 W. I-AwKmNs, A TREATISE OF PLEAS OF nm CRowN
595 (8th ed. 1824).
209. See also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). The Court in Black-
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There is widespread agreement that the decision to confess is often
the functional equivalent of a decision to plead guilty.210 Thus, it can
be argued that a major objective of the law of confessions should be
to make certain that a person confessing is afforded the same oppor-
tunities as a person pleading guilty who has not previously confessed.
Plainly, the law's objective in the guilty plea situation is to assure that
defendants plead guilty with full knowledge of the results that may fol-
low, of the alternatives available, and of the comparative costs and ad-
vantages of pursuing these alternatives. 211  A major objective of the
burn stressed that refusal to accept a confession made while the suspect was insane could
be justified either on the ground of the unreliability of such a statement or on the basis
of "simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should not operate
so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion." Typically, there was no discussion
of why the state "should" not take advantage of insane persons in this manner, i.e. what
interests would be infringed by doing so.
210. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). See also Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, - (1974) ("The natural concern which underlies many of these
decisions [dealing with the privilege against compelled self-incrimination other than at
the trial of the case] is that an inability to protect the right at one stage of a proceeding
may make its invocation useless at a later stage").
211. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (finding constitutional error in
the acceptance of a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was being entered
intelligently and voluntarily). See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
(suggesting that where the defendant denies guilt of the crime, a guilty plea may consti-
tutionally be accepted only if there is also a "strong factual basis for the plea" in the
record). In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Court held that where
a plea is offered to a charge that encompasses lesser included offenses, Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the judge to ascertain that the defendant
understands the difference between the greater and lesser charge and how that difference
applies to the facts at issue; it is not clear whether a similar requirement is embodied
within due process standards. Cf. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973) (even
though plea was accepted in full compliance with Rule 11 and constitutional standards,
it was open to attack on the ground that it was induced by "a combination of fear, co-
ercive police tactics, and illness, including mental illness"); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971) (where defendant entered plea in reliance upon prosecution's promise
not to make sentence recommendation and promise not kept, defendant was constitu-
tionally entitled to relief). But cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (de-
fendant who pled guilty with reasonably competent legal advice could not attack plea
by claiming unawareness that confession in state's possession was arguably subject to
challenge); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea entered in belief
that it was only available way to avoid possibility of death sentence was not rendered
unintelligent or involuntary when belief was inaccurate). These latter cases must rest
on an assumption that the need to assure finality of convictions outweighs the value of
preventing convictions based on guilty pleas that are not voluntary and intelligent (as
those phrases are used in the text). They do not stand for the proposition that it is
unnecessary to take reasonable precautions against a defendant's entering a guilty plea
under a mistaken apprehension about whether evidence in the possession of the prosecu-
tion is subject to attack or whether the plea is necessary to secure a tactical advantage.
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law of confessions, then, should be regarded as assuring that a person
who confesses does so with as complete an understanding of his tactical
position as possible. This, of course, would require awareness not only
of his abstract legal rights, but also of his practical ability to implement
those rights in light of his factual situation and of the tactical wisdom
of asserting them."'2
Although it has been largely unarticulated, the desire to ensure that
a confessing defendant makes a fully informed and reasoned choice has
permeated the case law. Despite the professed reliance on the need
to assure reliability, the early promise of benefit cases probably rested
to a significant extent upon the perceived unfairness of encouraging
a defendant to give up his trial rights. And the constitutional volun-
tariness cases, even if the analysis in them was confused, clearly re-
garded as important both the defendant's awareness of his legal and
factual status and his ability to judge his own tactical best interests.
With respect to the rights defined in Miranda, that case and Schneck-
loth strongly suggest that the requirement that there be a "voluntary"
waiver of these rights means that attention must be focused even more
directly upon the defendants conscious awareness. Seemingly, an im-
portant factor in this inquiry is the defendant's awareness of all of the
major facts relevant to an assessment of his tactical position.21 3
These cases are of minimal importance, however, in formulating a rule for determining
the admissibility of confessions-a determination which should focus on future situa-
tions. If a newly adopted confession rule appeared to threaten severely the finality of
many past convictions, the rule could-and probably should-be applied only prospec-
tively. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
212. One author suggests that the rationale best explaining the coerced confession
cases is that since a confession has such a pervasive impact upon the trial system, "no
confession obtained under circumstances not compatible with an accusatorial, adversary
system should be admitted into evidence." See Comment, The Coerced Confession
Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 313, 325 (1964). The objective
suggested in the text is consistent with this rationale, but fleshes out the "circumstances
not compatible with an accusatorial, adversary system." But cf. Robinson, Massiah,
Escobedo, and Rationale for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CuM. L.C. & P.S. 412,
424 (1965) (discussing seven possible justifications for limiting admissibility of confes-
sions and concluding that "the reach of current confessions exclusion doctrine can be
justified only in terms of protecting the interests of guilty defendants desiring to avoid
conviction").
213. A similar situation troubling the courts has been the failure of Internal Revenue
Service investigators to inform fully taxpayers who are being investigated that an investi-
gation has become one in which the Service contemplates criminal as well as civil penal-
ties. Generally, this shift in objective is implemented by having a Special Agent from
the Intelligence Division participate in the interviewing or interrogation. Federal courts
have repeatedly held that where the subject is not in custody, no Miranda warnings need
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Emphasis upon this aspect of the defendant's awareness is consist-
ent with the policies underlying the privilege against compelled self-
be given. See, e.g., United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 2627 (1975). These holdings, however, have often been accompanied by state-
ments that incriminating statements obtained by fraud, deceit, or trickery are inadmissi-
ble, whether or not the subject was in custody at the time of the statement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970). See also United States v. Marra, 481 F.2d 1196, 1203 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1004 (1973); United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972); United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 772 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). The deceit generally relied upon by defendants chal-
lenging confessions made during such investigations is the failure to inform the subject
of the shift in the nature of the investigation. Courts have been reluctant, however, to
find that this failure constitutes the sort of deceit that invokes the rule. This is es-
pecially true if the new investigator identified himself as a Special Agent, whether or
not the subject understood that involvement of a Special Agent indicated that criminal
prosecution was being contemplated. See, e.g., United States v. Marra, supra; United
States v. Lehman, supra; United States v. Stribling, supra (over dissent). In United
States v. Prudden, supra, the court rejected an argument that the failure to inform the
subject of the nature of the investigation plus the general atmosphere of friendliness and
cordiality generated by the agents constituted sufficient deceit to invoke the rule. See
also United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972)
(Special Agent's failure to identify himself as such was not material fraud, because
record shows that defendant did not understand significance of involvement of Special
Agent and therefore was not misled); United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (Special Agent's failure to explain significance
of his involvement to defendant, an experienced criminal lawyer, or to defendant's ac-
countant did not constitute the clear and convincing showing of material fraud neces-
sary to invoke the rule).
The Seventh Circuit has ruled that Miranda warnings must be given to a taxpayer
at the first contact after the case has been transferred to the Intelligence Division for
possible criminal prosecution-even if the interrogation is noncustodial. This rule is
based upon the conclusion that the danger of the taxpayer incriminating himself because
of a "misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and
the possible consequences of doing so" is as great in the noncustodial tax investigation
context as in the custodial traditional criminal investigation. See United States v. Dick-
erson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1113-17 (7th Cir. 1969). But cf. United States v. Beckwith, supra
(refusing to extend Miranda to interrogations in noncustodial circumstances after inves-
tigation "focused" on suspect who was given modified warnings; interrogation found not
coercive or misleading); United States v. Sicilia, 475 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973) (declining to extend Dickerson rule to criminal investigation
where inquiry had "focused" on suspect who was not yet in custody). The Seventh Cir-
cuit position seems clearly based upon the assumption that the fifth amendment and
Miranda are designed to protect a suspect's ability to make a well-informed tactical
choice:
We understand the teaching of Miranda to be that one confronted with govern-
mental authority in an adversary situation should be accorded the opportunity
to make an intelligent decision as to the assertion or relinquishment of those
constitutional rights designed to protect him under precisely such circum.
stances. ....
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incrimination. 214  In addition, it avoids the absurdity of restricting at-
tention to abstract legal rights when it is generally acknowledged that
factual information and tactical considerations may be fully as impor-
tant in implementing those rights as their theoretical existence. Of
course, recognition of this awareness as the objective of the law does
not mean that specific rules relating to confessions must implement this
goal to the maximum logical extent. It has traditionally been recog-
nized that the law relating to confessions is a compromise among com-
peting considerations, only one of which is the protection of the sub-
ject's interests.2 15 Moreover, this somewhat limited implementation of
the awareness objective is in accord with the fifth amendment privilege,
which has been recognized as less extensive than its policy foundations
logically might suggest. 216
Several arguments could be made against accepting the proposition
that the law of confessions should seek to assure that pretrial confes-
sions are made under circumstances maximizing the subject's ability to
make a reasoned tactical choice.217 One, of course, is based upon
Mt is the very fact that the taxpayer is not informed of the pendency
of a criminal investigation which aggravates the dilemma in which he finds
himself. Unaware of the possible consequences of his cooperation with the
agents, he may nevertheless believe that he is obligated to supply the necessary
information in order to satisfy any possible tax deficiency which he may owe.
United States v. Dickerson, supra at 1114, 1116. The same danger obviously concerns
other courts whose opinions indicate significant discomfort with the failure to protect
adequately this ability of the suspect.
214. The privilege is based in part on an almost metaphysical notion that encourag-
ing a person to participate in his own "downfall," i.e. his criminal conviction, is incon-
sistent with the person's inherent dignity as a human being, whether or not he is guilty.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 118, at 252. Fully informed choice seems a logical
way to define the choice a person should have about whether he is to be permitted to
degrade his own dignity.
215. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
216. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966) (scope of privilege does
not coincide with the "complex of values it helps to protect").
217. The discussions rejecting a broad objective for the law of confessions have not
been helpful. In Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974), for example, the court
in dicta rejected a requirement that the warning include the crime under investigation.
The object of the Supreme Court decisions, the court asserted, is to enable a suspect to
"make a rational decision, not necessarily the best one or one that would be reached
only after long and painstaking deliberation." Id. at 738. But the court devotes no ef-
fort to explaining how a decision made in ignorance of the operative facts (as contrasted
with the law) can be "rational." Perhaps one key to this court's position is its comment
that "it may be argued forcefully that a choice by a defendant to forego the presence
of counsel at a police interrogation is almost invariably an unintelligent course of ac-
tion." Id. at 738-39. If, of course, any waiver is certain to be against the subject's best
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precedential authority, both from the common law doctrine and from
the constitutional voluntariness test. But there are several reasons why
precedent should be given minimal respect here. As indicated in the
earlier discussion, the common law rule-if, in fact, it was a well-estab-
lished rule-developed at a time when police misconduct was not
viewed with the abhorence that it is today. In addition, there is no
evidence that the English common law rule represented a thoroughly
considered position. To the contrary, it is arguable that the refusal to
give ignorance or official deception any legal effect was an effort to
balance a stringent, and perhaps unrealistic, prohibition against prom-
ises and inducements. The development of the American common law
evidences no greater reflection on the underlying policy considerations,
and the development of constitutional doctrine consisted of little more
than a long-standing and apparently intentional refusal to consider di-
rectly specific factors such as ignorance and mistake. The complete
lack of analysis and supporting discussion in the only Supreme Court
case considering deception is unfortunately representative of the quality
of case law precedent. Greater emphasis should be placed instead
on the statements in Miranda and Schneckloth that suggest the
significance of ignorance and deception rather than relying on the ill-
considered and uncritically accepted common law authorities. In view
of the general lack of agreement on the extent that ignorance, mistake,
or deception give rise to constitutional issues, the whole matter should
tactical interests, the objective proposed in the text is inherently inconsistent with the
present law's position that a valid waiver can be made. It may be that if the position
advocated in the text were implemented effectively, far fewer valid waivers would be
found. But in the absence of reliable evidence to the contrary, it seems wise to
assume-as the Court undoubtedly did in Miranda-that in a significant percent of the
cases, waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent would be to the subject's tacti-
cal advantage, or at least not to his tactical disadvantage.
One other aspect of the Collins opinion offers insight into the motivation of those
courts that have exhibited hostility to the position advocated in the text. The court at
one point refers to the argument that information concerning the offense must be "in-
cluded in the pre-interrogation litany." Id. at 739. This suggests that the entire warn-
ing-waiver requirement is regarded as a meaningless technicality and therefore does not
deserve further development. The empirical evidence tends to support the assumption
that the warnings and the waiver requirement are unlikely to increase the quality of the
choice which a subject perceives as available to him. This may, however, not be inherent
in the approach of Miranda but rather due to the failure of the courts to define realistic-
ally the information that must be conveyed to the subject and the understanding that
must exist before a waiver may be made. At least until a more promising approach
appears, it seems unwise to continue to work with the law of confessions on the assump-
tion that it serves no legitimate function.
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be regarded as one particularly appropriate for de novo analysis and
resolution.
Practical objections could also be raised. Conceivably, the inquiry
required to implement this objective-that is, a reconstruction of the
subject's state of mind at a past time-is so difficult, time consuming
and unlikely of success that the possible beneficial results are out-
weighed by the time and energy consumed in the necessary investiga-
tions. But this objection overlooks the potential for creative use of pro-
cedural devices to avoid unjustified litigation; this potential is discussed
in detail in the next section.
A related argument might go to the possibly undefinable scope of
inquiry that acceptance of such an objective might require. Since an
almost limitless number of factors could be relevant to a subject's tac-
tical advantage, it is arguable that a rule focusing upon his ability to
make a reasoned tactical choice provides no logical basis for defining
-or limiting-the factors legally relevant. The result, according to
this line of reasoning, would be a rule as unmanageably broad and
flexible as the traditional voluntariness test. As noted above, however,
acceptance of the objective does not require adopting a legal criterion
for admissibility of confessions that demands awareness of every factor
helpful to the making of a reasoned tactical decision. Rather, accept-
ing the objective would simply focus attention on these matters and
suggest that the criterion should be drafted with them in mind. There
may well be legitimate considerations that would justify selecting only
a limited number of factors relevant to the tactical decision and identi-
fying them as legally relevant to the admissibility of the confession.
The final argument against the position advocated here is essentially
a philosophical one. It can be argued that although the law should
seek to prevent certain factors from influencing a suspect's decision to
confess, one who is guilty of a criminal offense has no legitimate basis
for withholding an admission of guilt to minimize the likelihood of his
conviction or the severity of the penalty he will receive. Thus the law
should not seek to further his ability to maximize his tactical advantage,
even if it is desirable to eliminate the effect of certain influences, such
as physical pain and discomfort. This argument, of course, takes issue
with the basic premise of the position suggested above. The choice
must be made intuitively and depends almost entirely upon the view
that is taken of the importance of the individual's dignity. There can
be little doubt that the ability to control or at least affect one's own
Vol. 1975:275]
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destiny is part-if not the essence-of the dignity of the individual and
similarly that it is desirable that this characteristic be respected in
others. But the question is whether this respect needs to be shown
by minimizing state exploitation of the subject's inability to choose
whether or not to confess in order to lessen the unpleasantness that
destiny holds for him. Perhaps it can be argued that one who engages
in criminal activity thereby reduces his intrinsic value sufficiently that
such exploitation by the state is no longer unacceptable. But, of
course, rules relating to interrogation and confessions may also influ-
ence the way in which innocent, but suspected, persons are treated and
may occasionally govern a situation in which an innocent suspect re-
solves the tactical dilemma in favor of confessing in order to minimize
the impact of a seemingly inevitable conviction. In addition, it can be
asserted that commission of an offense does not so alter a person's in-
herent worth that such exploitation is justified; indeed, this is an under-
lying assumption of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
The matter is not, however, susceptible to logical debate or empirical
inquiry and thus is a matter that must be resolved according to an intui-
tive definition of human dignity.
The case law also suggests another objective which might be ex-
pressly recognized. Since the development of the exclusionary rule,
much of the emphasis of search and seizure doctrine, as well as confes-
sion doctrine, has been on the value of the legal rules in preventing
improper police activities. The result has not infrequently been dis-
couragement generated by the apparent inability of rules of evidence
to control the behavior of law enforcement agencies. A careful review
of the development of confession law suggests that while deterring im-
proper methods of interrogation is certainly one legitimate objective of
this body of doctrine, preventing the use of certain self-incriminating
statements is an independent objective defensible on its own merits.
The early involuntariness cases stressed the offensiveness of permitting
a conviction to rest upon a coerced confession, 18 and later cases are
not at all inconsistent with the early cases in this respect.219 Preventing
218. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
219. See, e.g., LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974). In the course
of holding the defendant constitutionally entitled to challenge the voluntariness of a
statement offered to impeach, the court stated:
It is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct
belonging only in a police state should be admitted at the government's behest
in order to bolster its case.
Id. at 34.
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the use of certain confessions may be based upon the theory that reli-
ance on such evidence depreciates the image of the criminal justice sys-
tem in the eyes of the community and consequently makes it more dif-
ficult for the system to function effectively. The nonuse may also be
based upon the essentially intuitive notion that making use of "dirty"
evidence is wrong and to be avoided, whether or not specific disadvan-
tages demonstrably flow from considering such evidence.
In addition, there seems to be a feeling that although obtaining a
self-incriminating statement from a person in an impermissible way is
a violation of his inherent dignity, using that statement to the person's
disadvantage is a significantly incremental violation of that dignity.
This feeling is consonant with the notions underlying the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination, which abhor not only the applica-
tion of coercion itself but also the use of compelled testimony.2 ' As
are the sentiments about the exploitation of a subject's lack of knowl-
edge at the time he confesses, this feeling is a largely intuitive notion
and is based upon the perceived offensiveness of causing a person to
participate in a process leading to his own detriment, even if the parti-
cipation is of the relatively indirect sort involved in using a self-incri-
minatory statement against the speaker.
In opposition to accepting the prohibition against the use of certain
confessions as a major objective of confession law are several argu-
ments--the utilitarian one emphasizing the cost of sacrificing reliable
evidence of an accused's guilt and the intuitive assertion that whatever
an individual's dignity involves, it is not offended by such indirect par-
ticipation in his own downfall. Not much helpful discussion can be had
concerning the second argument. The first is really related to the sec-
ond and is basically the proposition that reliable evidence should not
be ignored in the determination of guilt or innocence unless there is
an important reason fo doing so. Whether or not there is sufficient
basis for rejecting certain statements depends upon how one measures
the effect on a defendant's dignity of using the statements and, of
course, how one evaluates the likelihood that exclusion of the state-
ments will prevent similar confession situations from arising in the fu-
ture, as well as the importance of preventing such situations.
220. The fifth amendment language itself refers to a person being a "witness" in "any
criminal case." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Compared to the historical roots of the privi-
lege, extension of the privilege to situations outside the criminal defendant's own trial
has been relatively recent. See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 116.
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While the matter cannot be regarded as free from doubt, it seems
that the emphasis in the case law with regard to self-incriminating state-
ments and the offensiveness, perceived by many persons, of using im-
properly obtained evidence together constitute sufficient justification
for making avoidance of use of improperly obtained statements an im-
portant objective of confession law. Recognition of this objective as
independent of the objective of deterring the improper acquisition of
statements will assist in clarifying the analysis required by the problems
of concern here.
C. The Means
Much of the discussion here has proceeded on the assumption that
the only methods of dealing with confessions affected by promises, de-
ception, ignorance, or mistake are blanket rules invalidating the con-
fessions. This assumption, however, ignores creative use of several
procedural devices: special evidentiary requirements and the burdens
of producing evidence and of persuasion.
The burden of persuasion, of course, is the burden of establishing
the facts at issue 2"-in this context, the defendant's awareness or the
lack of it and its effect upon his decision to confess. Making lack of
awareness controlling but placing the burden of establishing this fact
on the defendant avoids many of the problems anticipated by those who
disfavor increasing the prosecution's burden and who fear that court
time will have to be allocated to litigate nomeritorious cases. The
evidentiary standard itself can also be manipulated. Thus if there is
a need to take special care to avoid creating new impediments for the
prosecution, a burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence or
even of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be used.
As a procedural device which controls only whether or not a matter
is put in issue, the burden of coming forward with, or of "producing,"
the evidence is distinguishable from the burden of proof.22 " If the
burden of proof is placed upon one party, the effect of this action can
be mitigated by imposing upon the other party the burden of coming
forward with evidence. Thus, the first party is put to the trouble of
meeting his burden only when the other party has already produced a
significant amount of evidence on the issue.
Finally, special proof requirements may be imposed. For example,
221. See McCoRmicK, supra note 1, § 336, at 784.
222. Id.
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a defendant might be required to come forward with evidence other
than his own testimony in order to raise the issue of his actual aware-
ness of the meaning of the warnings. The decision of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in State v. Jones, discussed above,2 23 can be read as im-
posing such a proof requirement. Arguably, the court there regarded
the difficulties of inquiring into a defendant's actual understanding as
so great that in order to raise the issue, a defendant would be required
to come forward with an especially persuasive type of evidence, that
is, his own conduct at the time of the interrogation from which his lack
of understanding could be inferred.
The imposition and distribution of these burdens and requirements
is a complex matter that should be influenced by several considerations.
One is the statistical likelihood that the facts will actually coincide with
the version of one of the parties; a burden may be placed upon the
party whose version is less likely to be accurate. 224 Another considera-
tion is the relative access of the parties to the evidence needed to re-
solve the issue; a burden may be placed upon that party who has
greater access to the facts or who can probably produce evidence with
less effort or expense.225 Last is the potential need to discourage
costly and unjustified litigation; a burden may be placed upon those
defendants who, if not restrained by such a device, might produce as
a group an unacceptable amount of litigation.226
The three procedural devices can be placed on a continuum accord-
ing to the heavy-handedness with which they further the considerations
identified in the preceding paragraph. A requirement of some speci-
fied type of evidence is likely to be the most difficult to meet and,
therefore, would impose the most prophylactic barrier to the success
of those upon whom it is placed. The burden of proof is probably
somewhat less restrictive, depending partly on the standard of proof
demanded. Finally, the burden of coming forward with evidence is
clearly the least difficult of the three to meet.
If these devices are carefully distributed among the parties, various
combinations of objectives can be achieved. For example, it may be
desirable to avoid litigation when little evidence is available, but to im-
pose a severe burden upon one party in those situations in which evi-
dence on the issue can be obtained. To achieve these objectives, the
223. See text following note 148 supra.
224. See McCoRIUCK, supra note 1, § 337, at 787.
225. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (c) (P.O.D. 1962).
226. See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 337, at 786-87.
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burden of coming forward with evidence could be placed on the party
with best access to the evidence, and the burden of proof (and per-
haps a requirement of specified evidence) could be placed on the other
party. Thus in those cases in which there was little evidence available
on the issue, the first party would fail to sustain its burden of producing
evidence; in those cases in which the first party succeeded-but only
in those cases-the second party would bear a heavy burden of proof
on the issue.
Some constitutional limitations exist upon the manner in which these
procedural devices can be distributed, but these limitations are flexible.
For example, although the prosecution has the burden in criminal liti-
gation of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, yet in regard to
specific issues, the burden of proof may be shifted to the defendant
if this is "just" and does not subject the defendant to "hardship or op-
pression. 227 Apparently, this means that two conditions must be pre-
sent for shifting the burden. First, once the prosecution has proved
those elements upon which it bears the burden, the statistical likelihood
that the facts on the remaining issue or issues are consistent with guilt
must at least be greater than fifty percent. Second, the shift of burden
to the defendant must presumably serve some legitimate function, such
as compelling defendants to produce evidence on matters in which they
have sole or at least much greater access to the facts.228
Supreme Court case law has unfortunately largely ignored these pro-
cedural matters. It is at least clear that the prosecution has the burden
of proving the voluntariness of a confession, although the preponder-
227. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934).
[W]ithin limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from
the state. . . and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these, that
the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be re-
quired to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least
that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the
shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subject-
ing the accused to hardship or oppression.
Id. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975) (due process precludes requir-
ing manslaughter defendant to prove sudden provocation); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d
111, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968) (due process violated by placing burden of alibi
on defendant).
228. This conclusion is also reflected in the constitutional doctrine that a presump-
tion used in criminal litigation will violate due process standards unless the presumed
fact is more likely than not to exist if the proved fact exists, see Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969), and perhaps unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the presumed fact will exist, cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-18 (1970).
[Vol. 1975:275
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/1
Vol. 1975:275] MODERN LAW OF CONFESSIONS 341
ance of evidence standard is all that is constitutionally required. 2 9
Apparently, the same rule also applies to a waiver of rights under
Miranda. Less clear, however, are the burdens under the fourth
amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
and under the attendant exclusionary rule. In Schneckloth, the Court
apparently accepted the proposition that the prosecution bears the bur-
den of proof when it seeks to justify a search by claiming that consent
thereto was voluntarily given.230  In United States v. Matlock,231 the
Court noted that it had no occasion to consider whether the trial court
committed error in placing the burden of proof-apparently in regard
to the entire issue of the reasonableness of the search-on the prose-
cution and in defining that burden as one of proof by the greater weight
of the evidence.2 13  But there has been no recognition that the Con-
stitution may possibly direct or permit a careful definition and distribu-
tion of the various sub-burdens in order to achieve maximum value at
minimal cost.2 33  Even if it is constitutionally necessary that the burden
of proof be placed on the prosecution, there is sufficient flexibility in
doctrine to permit some redistribution of that burden and of the burden
of production on particular subissues. In fact, it is likely and reason-
able that there is more flexibility in regard to collateral matters such
as voluntariness determinations than there is in regard to those issues
relating directly to guilt or innocence.
The state and lower federal courts have shown more initiative in the
search area. Although there are some jurisdictions in which the entire
burden of proving the unreasonableness of a contested search lies on
the defendant,234 in most jurisdictions the prosecution has the burden
229. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
230. 412 U.S. at 222.
231. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
232. Id. at 167-69, 177-78 & n.14.
233. This failure has extended to other areas as well, including the substantive crim-
inal law. In deciding the so-called "strict liability" cases, the Court has never addressed
a compromise which would make state of mind an element but put it into issue only
when and if the defendant comes forward with evidence that he lacked the requisite
awareness. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Shevlin-Car-
penter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
234. See, e.g., MONT. Rv. CODES ANN. § 95-1806(f) (1969) ("The burden of prov-
ing that the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant"). See also
State v. Maxwell, 502 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) ("It is the movant who
has the burden of presenting evidence to sustain his contentions that the search and
seizure was unlawful"). Some cases reflect confusion on the question of who has the
burden. Compare Clemons v. State, 501 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ("The
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of establishing the propriety of the search. 2 15  But if the prosecution
shows that the search was made pursuant to a warrant, a number of
courts have held that the burden then shifts to the defendant to estab-
lish that the warrant was insufficient.2 38 Arguably, this shift is justi-
fiable if one accepts the propositions that most warrants are issued in
a manner consistent with fourth amendment standards (a presumption
of official regularity) and that the affidavits on which warrants are is-
sued are readily available, thereby affording both parties equal access
to the operative facts. Similarly, the defendant has been held to have
the burden of proving facts giving him standing to assert the impro-
priety of a search and seizure237 and to have the burden of producing
by affidavit such facts as are within his knowledge indicating the need
for further inquiry into the validity of a search warrant.28  Although
the prosecution still has the burden of proving the reasonableness of
a pre-flight airport search of passengers, a defendant asserting that such
searches were being exploited for an improper purpose has been held
to have at least the burden of coming forward with evidence indicating
that there may have been such an exploitation.23 9  There have also
been suggestions that the consent to search must be proved by a spe-
cific kind of evidence, that is, an express statement or some overt act
from which a desire to forego exercise of personal rights can be ascer-
tained.240  Finally, courts have recognized that even if the prosecution
burden was on [the defendant] to establish that he was the victim of an unlawful search
and seizure") with Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
(burden is upon prosecution to establish consent by clear and convincing evidence).
These cases seem not to recognize the different subissues or the value of assigning sep-
arately the burden for each subissue. Valerio, for example, involved consent, an issue
on which there is general agreement that the prosecution has the burden of proof. But
Clemens involved standing, an issue on which some courts do place the burden on the
defendant.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Cooks, 493 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1974); People v.
Boorem, 519 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974); Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla. App. 1974).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Various Gambling Devices, 478 F.2d 1194, 1199 (5th
Cir. 1973) ("Since claimant concedes that the seizure was made under a warrant, he
bears the burden of establishing the illegality of the search"); Russ v. Camden, 506
S.W.2d 529 (Ark. 1974); State v. Baca, 84 N.M. 513, 505 P.2d 856 (1973); State v.
Nearing, 16 Ore. App. 30, 517 P.2d 308 (1973).
237. See, e.g., Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033, 1035-36 (D. Neb. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 482 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1973); People v. Trusty, 516 P.2d 423, 425
(Colo. 1973).
238. See State v. Wright, 266 Ore. 163, 167, 511 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1973).
239. See United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
240. See Hardy v. State, - Ala. App. -, -, 297 So. 2d 399, 401 (Ala. Crim. App.
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bears the burden of proof when the issue is contested before or during
trial, a defendant who seeks post-conviction relief assumes the burden
of establishing the impropriety of challenged policy activity.24'
Certainly, it can be argued that if greater care were taken in defining
the burdens and requirements upon parties litigating the admissibility
of confessions, the issues could be more carefully defined and the legal
materiality of various matters more clearly established without impos-
ing undue procedural or practical burdens upon prosecutors.
D. The Considerations
To evaluate adequately potential rules determining the types of ig-
norance, mistake, and expectation of benefit that should invalidate a
self-incriminating statement, all relevant considerations must be identi-
fied. Categorization, here as elsewhere, is largely a matter of subjec-
tive preference, but the following matters undoubtedly need to be
taken into account:
1. Maximization of Subject's Ability To Make
Fully Informed Tactical Choice
Acceptance of the objective proposed above, of course, renders this
a major consideration. Full implementation would direct the condem-
nation of confessions made in ignorance of, or under a misapprehension
concerning, any matter of fact or law relating to the decision to confess.
On the other hand, it would not require condemnation of statements
made in return for promises of benefits or in the expectations of bene-
fits if the promises were kept or the expectations were realized. The
difficulty, however, of assuring that only realistic expectations and
promises are relied upon may lead to further development of a protec-
tive rule. If it is accepted that only an experienced attorney can ade-
quately advise a defendant on the reasonableness of promises or expec-
tations, full implementation of this consideration may well direct that
no statement be considered unless made after consultation with an at-
torney.
2. Avoidance of Use of Improperly Obtained Statements
It was argued above that independent emphasis should be placed
1974) ("[IThe State must prove that the consent [to search] be evidenced by a statement
or some overt act by the owner sufficient to indicate his intent to waive his rights").
241. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, - Ind. -, 313 N.E.2d 542, 545 (1974).
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upon the use of improperly obtained statements as contrasted with the
discouragement of the actions or circumstances which rendered their
making improper. In terms of resolving the problems posed here, this
proposition suggests that although attention shuld be devoted to
those doctrinal rules that will most effectively discourage improper in-
vestigation and interrogation techniques, it is also necessary to consider
whether using a statement would constitute a significantly incremental
infringement of the defendant's dignity, even if exclusion holds little
promise of discouraging future improper police activities. In some
situations, the evidentiary value of the statements may outweigh the
incremental infringement of dignity caused by their use; nevertheless,
the value of preventing the use of statements in some circumstances
must be recognized as an independent objective.
3. Assuring Accurate Trial Outcome
The need to assure that only reliable self-incriminating statements
are used is, of course, still an important consideration. Vigorous im-
plementation of this consideration might direct that all statements made
without full awareness of the circumstances or under an expectation
of benefit-however stimulated-be condemned, even though in some
cases, ignorance and expectation of benefit do not pose significant dan-
gers of unreliability. Whether those situations that do pose such dan-
gers can be identified and adequately discouraged without a blanket
rule seems the critical consideration.
4. Efficient Law Enforcement
Of course, the major countervailing consideration to the factors out-
lined above is the effective ascertainment of guilt or innocence of sus-
pects. This consideration suggests that any interrogation technique
that does not unduly offend important values should be permitted un-
less there is no need for further evidence of guilt. Since it may be
significantly less costly in terms of resource allocation to seek a self-
incriminatory statement even if other evidence is available, "need"
should be defined to include only legitimate law enforcement needs.
5. Discouraging Undesirable Police Conduct
To the extent that undesirable police conduct is the focus of the rule,
emphasis should be placed upon the responsibility of law enforcement
personnel for ignorance or misapprehension. Implementation of this
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consideration would direct condemnation of statements obtained by use
of police deception (assuming it is regarded as undesirable) or by the
failure of law enforcement officers to correct what a reasonably alert
person would perceive as a misapprehension. This consideration does
not address itself, however, to the appropriate position to be taken
when a statement is made in ignorance or under a misapprehension
for which law enforcement personnel have no responsibility.
6. Provision of Guidelines for Police Activity
Rules affecting the admissibility of evidence are obviously also
guidelines for those seeking such evidence. It is important, therefore,
that rules relating to confessions either contain reasonably precise and
discernible guidelines for police action or that they hold the promise
for developing such guidelines. This consideration, of course, militates
against the approach of the voluntariness rule and Miranda-waiver
combination. On the other hand, this consideration also suggests that
if the subject of an inquiry is so complex or difficult to deal with that
a discernible rule, easy of application, cannot be anticipated, the law
ought not make the effort to establish one. For example, a reasonable
argument can be made that it will be so difficult to identify those facts
of which a defendant under interrogation must be aware that realistic
guidelines for specifying them are unlikely to be developed, and there-
fore the matter should not be considered in promulgating rules for con-
fessions.
7. Administrative Practicability
As the administrative dissatisfaction with the voluntariness rule
demonstrates, it is necessary that rules relating to confessions be suf-
ficiently discernable and definable that trial courts have workable
guidelines for deciding specific cases and appellate courts have similar
standards for reviewing trial court judgments. As in the preceding
consideration, this consideration suggests that the rule be limited to
those areas in which it is reasonable to expect such rules to be de-
veloped.
8. Avoidance of Excessive Litigation "Costs"
The time that will be taken litigating issues raised under any con-
templated rule is a necessary consideration. A rule that invites numer-
ous claims must be evaluted in light of the cost of separating meritori-
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ous claims from nonmeritorious ones; the extent to which claims can
be expected to be meritorious is, of course, important. Thus, this con-
sideration militates against a rule that would enable a large percent of
criminal defendants to put prosecutors and courts to a troublesome task
of litigating what will usually be nonmeritorious claims. The nature of
the inquiries that a contemplated rule necessitates is also relevant.
Thus if extensive litigation will be required in a large number of cases
in order to resolve the issues opened up by a rule, this outcome mili-
tates against adoption of the rule. In view of the difficulty of re-
creating "state of mind," arguably, the inquiries necessitated by deter-
minations involving a defendant's conscious awareness at the time of
interrogation are especially susceptive to the objections this considera-
tion offers. To some extent, though, these objections can be met by
the creative allocation of burdens of persuasion and production and the
imposition of special evidentiary requirements.
E. An Accommodation
The need to deal more adequately with the legal effect of ignorance,
mistake, and reliance upon expectations of benefit that surround the
making of a self-incriminating statement is clear. Since the initial for-
mulation of the common law rule, the reliance factor has been stressed,
unfortunately at the expense of the other factors in the trilogy. The
voluntariness test-both as a rule of evidence and as a constitutional
doctrine-apparently continued this approach, but tended to merge
these factors with other matters unrelated to the subject's awareness
in a confusing and unsatisfactory "totality of the circumstances" test.
The Miranda waiver doctrine may focus more directly and specifically
upon the subject's awareness, as indicated in Schneckloth, but the deci-
sions in the state and lower federal courts demonstrate that it is still
far from clear exactly who needs to prove what when the validity of
waiver is challenged on these grounds.
The analysis above suggests the need to separate "awareness" from
the other factors traditionally lumped together with it in the voluntari-
ness analysis. In addition, this analysis emphasizes that the defendant's
understanding of the facts and the law is distinguishable from his pos-
sible reliance upon expectations of benefit. The latter generally con-
cerns the defendant's prediction of how discretionary authority will be
exercised by police, judges, prosecutors, and others, and since it there-
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fore differs from simple awareness of existing facts, it can beneficially
be considered separately.
Analysis will also be furthered if the objective of making the defend-
ant's decision whether or not to confess as fully informed and reasoned
as possible is recognized as a major objective of the law of confession.
Adoption of this objective almost necessarily leads to the conclusion
that exploitation of a subject's ignorance or mistake-and certainly the
creation of such ignorance or mistake-is inappropriate and should be
condemned insofar as this can be done without incurring excessive
countervailing costs. Moreover, this is true whether the ignorance or
mistake concerns the existence of an abstract legal right, the law re-
lating to implementation of that right, or facts that influence the tactical
decision to exercise that right. Although reliance upon an expectation
of benefit would remain a necessary area of inquiry if the awareness
objective were adopted, the objective suggests the inappropriateness of
the traditional approach which regarded any such reliance in invali-
dating a statement if the reliance was based upon a promise or repre-
sentation by a person in authority-even if the promise or representa-
tion was kept or accurate. This conclusion follows because the tradi-
tional approach would, if fully enforced, often prevent a defendant
from making that decision which is to his maximum tactical advantage.
Focusing on the tactical nature of the decision to confess, then, leads
to the conclusion that the traditional approach is too narrow insofar as
it emphasizes reliance upon expectation of benefit but ignores mistake
and deceit. It is also too inflexible insofar as it condemns reliance
upon even reasonably accepted and kept promises and accurate repre-
sentations of tactical advantage.
1. Ignorance or Mistake
The most appropriate resolution of the issue posed by ignorance or
mistake is to require that a defendant have an accurate perception of
the basic facts and law concerning his potential liability in order that
a waiver of his rights to remain silent and to the presence of counsel
be valid. Given the likelihood that defendants will in fact usually have
such information, as well as the need to avoid forcing prosecutors to
take steps routinely to establish such awareness, it would be reasonable
to require a defendant to come forward with credible evidence of his
lack of awareness if he wished to challenge a confession on that ground.
Thus, in order to lay the foundation for the admissibility of a confes-
Vol. 1975:275]
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sion, the prosecution would need to do no more than is presently re-
quired, that is, prove the giving of the warnings and the fact of waiver.
No inquiry into the defendant's awareness would be necessary-and
no proof of such awareness by the prosecution required-unless the
defendant himself produced sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt that he had the requisite awareness.
A more difficult question is whether the type of evidence necessary
to raise the issue should be limited to the subject's conduct, at the time
of interrogation, which would indicate to a reasonable person that the
subject was unaware of critical facts or legal matters. Limiting the evi-
dence in this manner would serve several functions. It would mini-
mize a defendant's ability to develop and present falsified proof be-
cause all evidence developed after the interrogation would be ignored.
It would also reduce the burden upon prosecutors by putting them to
their proof only when this especially reliable evidence was available.
Moreover, this limitation would arguably confine ligitation concerning
the subject's awareness to those situations in which evidence permitting
reasonably reliable resolution of the issue was available. Where, for
example, the proof consists only of defendant's testimony that he was
unaware of critical facts or legal matters and testimony by prosecution
witnesses that the defendant appeared to understand the situation, the
likelihood of reliable resolution of the issue may be so low that the mat-
ter should not be litigated; with such a limitation, it would not be liti-
gated. Finally, a limitation of this kind would advance the considera-
tion of providing rules to govern police conduct. When a subject has
by some statement or act manifested his lack of understanding, it is
reasonable to expect interrogating law enforcement officials to respond
by taking further actions to make the subject aware of the relevant facts
or law. But if the subject has given no indication of his ignorance,
it is perhaps unrealistic to expect officers to discern whether or not he
is in fact ignorant. This appears to have been the rationale for the
court's apparent demand in State v. Jones that the defendant establish
his lack of understanding of the warnings by an act "reasonably
alert[ing] an interrogation officer .that the warning must have been mis-
apprehended."'2 42
On the other hand, limiting the type of evidence sufficient to put
the matter in issue might sometimes artificially restrict a defendant's
242. 37 Ohio St. 2d 21, 27, 306 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1974). See text accompanying
notes 148 & 149 supra.
[Vol. 1975:275
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/1
MODERN LAW OF CONFESSIONS
ability to establish the basic defect in his confession. In addition, it
is not clear that administrative efficiency strongly argues in favor of the
limitation. If there is no evidence other than the defendant's after-
the-fact testimony concerning his ignorance, an attack upon the admis-
sibility of the statement will normally be ineffective; defense counsel
would be aware of this and therefore unlikely to raise the issue in an
illusory hope of success. Although stressing the need to avoid de-
manding the impossible of police agencies is obviously appropriate, it
does not follow that countervailing considerations-such as respect for
defendant's actual capacity for informed self-determination-are less
important. Sometimes these considerations outweigh the need for
practical demands of the police and should require exclusion of a state-
ment obtained under circumstances which police could not have been
expected to alter. The difficulties of the police in discerning ignorance
not objectively manifested and the difficulties of the prosecution in
later recreating the defendant's "informed" mind could both be dras-
tically minimized, however, if there was an initial requirement that the
defendant be informed of the operative facts and law. This require-
ment could appropriately be added to the Miranda warnings and would
oblige the police first to determine the basic facts and law relating to
the subject's liability, second to inform the subject of these, and third
to correct any misconceptions made apparent in regard to these mat-
ters. If this is done, the likelihood that subjects will have the requisite
knowledge seems high enough to justify allocating the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant in the manner suggested above.243
243. If the police fail to inform a suspect of these facts, the issue whether the prose-
cution should be permitted to salvage a statement by establishing that the subject was
already aware of the facts poses a difficult question. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 468-73 n.43 (1966) (statement inadmissible despite knowledge of rights if subject
not warned of right to silence and that anything said may be used against him and of
right to presence of attorney, but failure to inform subject of right to state-provided
counsel will not render statement inadmissible if there was no doubt at time as to his
ability to provide his own counsel). Such an opportunity should be afforded the prose-
cution if this would not, under the circumstances, create a loophole endangering the en-
tire scheme, if the element of the scheme involved is not regarded as sufficiently im-
portant to justify an absolute exclusionary rule, or if, weighing these factors, the danger
of a damaging loophole in an important part of the scheme is outweighed by the value
of using the statements.
It is arguable that giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove knowledge when
there was no furnishing of information to the defendant would create an incentive to
ignore the requirement of conveying the information. This would be especially true in
those situations in which the officers have no hope of obtaining a statement if the subject
is aware of the facts. Moreover, knowledge of the facts may be as important a part
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This accommodation of the considerations is desirable for several
reasons. First, it makes clear that a knowing, voluntary waiver can
only be made with that information-whether factual or legal-neces-
sary to a reasoned tactical decision. It recognizes the obvious fact that
the most important variables in determining the tactical wisdom of con-
fessing are not likely to be the abstract law but rather the factual con-
text to which the law applies. Therefore, this accommodation at least
provides the basis for a rational relationship between waiver doctrine
and the underlying objectives of the law of confessions.
Second, the accommodation is unlikely to impose an unrealistic bur-
den on law enforcement agencies. In most cases, there will be no diffi-
culty in determining what facts need to be disclosed if those facts are
available to the interrogating agency. For example, if the victim of
an assault has died or is in serious condition, this fact must be disclosed.
If the subject's involvement in a scheme may make him liable for the
crime of another person through the law of parties or a felony-murder
rule, that doctrine of law must be explained. In some cases, the facts
may be so complex that a reasonable law enforcement officer cannot
determine what needs to be revealed. In such a case, the proposed
rule would not permit a waiver of the right to counsel or the right to
remain silent. This is appropriate. If the officer cannot master the
facts well enough to apply the rule, there is a high likelihood that the
subject cannot master them well enough to make an adequate decision
about waiver; thus any self-incriminating statement would be made
without the information that should be required. The same result
would be reached if an important fact is unavailable to the police, for
example, if they are unaware of the condition of the victim of an as-
of the overall scheme as knowledge of the rights to remain silent, to prevent self-incrim-
ination by avoiding oral statements, and to presence of counsel during interrogation;
therefore, by analogy, Miranda suggests no such salvage opportunity should be available.
On the other hand, it can reasonably be asserted that subjects generally will be aware
of the facts; thus, providing the prosecution with an opportunity to salvage a statement
is unlikely to result in admission of many, if any, statements actually made in ignorance
of the operative facts. In addition, in view of the offensiveness of rejecting a statement
made with knowledge of both the abstract legal rights and the tactical considerations
involved in the subject's situation, the cost of denying the prosecution such an opportun.
ity seems extremely high. On balance, it would seem reasonable to permit the prosecu-
tion to prove such awareness and thus save a statement that would otherwise be inadmis-
sible for failure to inform the subject of the factual situation. The burden should be
upon the prosecution, of course, and should be heavy, perhaps one of clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the subject was aware of the information at issue.
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sault. In such situations, no waiver should be permitted because no
adequately informed tactical choice can be made.24"
244. The position of American Law Institutes Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure on deception is unclear. An early uncirculated draft apparently attempted to de-
fine some deceptive interrogation practices that might be prohibited, but this approach
was abandoned in later drafts. The rationale given is unconvincing. First, the com-
mentary suggests, efforts to deal with some forms of deception might create the impres-
sion that the Institute approves of other forms. A MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 140.4, Comment at 356 (P.O.D. 1975). This impression, of course, could
have been avoided by an express statement that specified prohibitions were not intended
to be exhaustive. Further, the commentary notes that a flat bar to all deception would
result in an inquiry into the motivation of interrogating officers (which is apparently
regarded as undesirable for unstated reasons) and might cause exclusion of statements
which "many would consider not unfairly obtained." Id. This, of course, is merely a
statement of an unwillingness or inability to define those sorts of deception that should
be regarded as "fair." That the ALI simply refused or found itself unable to face the
critical question is confirmed by the reporter's expression of belief that "the issue of de-
ception is one which should be left to the courts to pass upon as part of the broader
inquiry which they must make" under the prohibition in § 140.4(b) against "any . ..
method which, in light of [the subject's] age, intelligence, and mental and physical con-
dition, unfairly undermines his ability to make a choice whether to make a statement
Id. In other words, the Code would leave the courts to develop further a body
of case law which has already demonstrated judicial inability or unwillingness to tackle
the problem. It is difficult to evaluate the ALI's efforts to overcome the obstacles, how-
ever, because the ALI refuses to permit outsiders access to the preliminary draft contain-
ing the efforts that were abandoned before the formulation of the circulated drafts.
In several limited ways, the Code does address the issue of deception. Section 140.2
prohibits misrepresentations that a subject is legally obligated to make a statement.
This, of course, reflects clearly existing constitutional law and probably beyond dispute
is desirable policy. Section 140.6 prohibits any action "which is designed to, or which
under the circumstances creates a significant risk that it will, result in an untrue incrim-
inating statement by an arrested person." This language restates the position, taken by
a number of American courts, which has proved inadequate to implement the underlying
policies demanding vindication. Section 150.2(9) prohibits the use of a statement in-
duced in the absence of counsel if the statement "deals with matters that are so com-
plex or confusing that, in light of such person's age, intelligence, and mental and physi-
cal condition, there is a substantial risk that such statement may be misleading or unreli-
able or its use may be unfair . . . ." (Emphasis added.) (Inducing such statements is
not, however, condemned.) When use is unfair is, of course, unclear. The accompany-
ing note indicates the test may be whether admission "may prejudice the fair presenta-
tion of [a] defense," but makes clear that the mere fact that a lawyer would have
advised against the making of the statement-that is, that making it was tactically un-
wise-is not enough. Id., Explanatory Note § 150.2, at 66. No effort is made to
elaborate helpfully on "fairness," and the note discussion, when it becomes specific at
all, tends to suggest that accuracy and evidentiary reliability are the touchstones. This
approach, as the text of this Article argues, misses much of the point.
The ALl has apparently made some effort to deal with the problem. But faced with
the task of defining when deception that has no tendency to induce an inaccurate state-
ment should be condemned, the Institute simply abandoned much of the task and, to
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2. Reliance Upon Expectation of Benefit
Reliance upon expectations of benefits is a somewhat different prob-
lem. Again, this situation presents a defendant with a need to make
a tactical decision. In addition, however, the resolution of this matter
must be harmonized with a confession/plea bargaining system in which
early cooperation with law enforcement officials is likely to be a sig-
nificant advantage in obtaining lenient disposition. It seems appro-
priate to treat separately those situations in which the defendant's ex-
pectation is based upon promises or representations made by law en-
forcement or prosecution personnel and those in which it is not.
Where there has been no such promise or representation, a confes-
sion should be inadmissible if it was made in reasonable reliance upon
an unrealized expectation of a benefit relating to the processing or out-
come of the criminal prosecution. Such a rule is appropriate because
of the general assumption-often a correct one-that cooperation by
confessing will lead to such benefits. The criminal justice system, by
perpetuating and perhaps encouraging the practice leading to these as-
sumptions, should be required to assure that the practice is followed
in particular cases.245 Where the anticipated benefit is collateral in a
broad sense, that is, unrelated to the prosecution or criminal justice sys-
tem personnel, the possibilities become so diverse and difficult to cate-
gorize that their effect must be ignored for practical reasons. Even
though the expectations of benefits may have been considered col-
lateral under the traditional voluntariness rule, if the benefits are re-
lated to criminal justice system personnel-as, for instance, more favor-
the extent that it persevered, lapsed into the same vague phraseology that the courts have
been hiding behind for years.
245. Several courts have held that a determination of involuntariness cannot be based
upon evidence that, on the basis of past experience with law enforcement agencies and
stories related by friends, the defendant believed that he would be mistreated if he did
not make a statement. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 41 Ill. 2d 102, 242 N.E.2d 160
(1968); Commonwealth v. Moore, 443 Pa. 364, 279 A.2d 179 (1971). In Moore, this
holding was justified on the ground that the prosecution would be unable to meet ef-
fectively such evidence because the names of those alleged to have been involved in the
earlier incidents would often not be available or those involved would be unlikely to re-
call reliably the circumstances. Whatever the merits of these decisions, they can be dis-
tinguished. The availability of more favorable treatment in return for cooperating in
one's conviction, as well as the awareness of this availability, is arguably more wide-
spread and reliably documented than police abuse in obtaining a statement. A defend-
ant's testimony that he relied upon an expectation of such benefit is therefore more
likely to be both accurate and reasonable than testimony that the defendant relied upon
the expectation that he would be abused if he declined to make a statement.
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able treatment in jail pending disposition of the case-the expectations
should nevertheless bring the rule into play.
Again, it would be appropriate to require the defendant to come for-
ward with reasonable evidence of his reliance and of his failure to
realize the anticipated benefit in order to raise the issue when there
has been no promise or representation made to him. This would avoid
compelling prosecutors to prove routinely a "negative" involving diffi-
cult-to-develop factual material. When the defendant has, by his own
testimony or other proof, made a credible case of reasonable reliance
and disappointment, the prosecutor would have the duty of meeting the
issue and would bear the burden of proof. Because of the relatively
few situations in which the issue will actually be raised, the duty is un-
likely to be overly burdensome.
Where the expectation is based upon a promise or a representation,
whether express or implied, by law enforcement or court personnel,
a different approach may be justified because of the clearer responsi-
bility of the criminal justice system as well as the greater ability of the
chosen procedure to affect future similar situations. Several possibili-
ties exist. Drawing upon the guilty plea analogy, the rule could insist
either that the bargain be kept or that the subject be entitled to with-
draw his confession and proceed to trial free of its spectre.246  The
danger in the confession-bargain situation is not simply that of noncom-
pliance, but also that of overreaching in the bargaining process. Thus,
a second alternative would be to provide subsequent judicial review of
the bargain by authorizing courts to suppress a confession if the prom-
ise was not kept, the representation was inaccurate, or if the bargain
was the product of overreaching by law enforcement personnel. De-
veloping standards for determining what constitutes "overreaching"
may well be so difficult, however, that no reasonable result can be ex-
pected. No such standards have yet been developed for the plea bar-
gaining process, despite a general recognition that the danger of over-
reaching by overcharging exists.24'
246. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
247. The AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JlUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNC-
TION, Prosecution Standard 3.9(e) (1971) provides: "The prosecutor should not bring
or seek charges greater in number or degree than he can reasonably support with evi-
dence at trial." For discussion of the standard, see the accompanying commentary.
The standard, of course, does not deal with charges that could be supported with evi-
dence but either would not result in incremental penalties or, if such penalties could be
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A final possibility would be to require the presence and assistance
of counsel-that is, make the right counsel nonwaivable if confession
bargaining is carried out.2 48  Although the basic assumption-that
obtained, would not have been brought unless trial was otherwise contemplated. Thus,
the standard does not deal with the troublesome situations.
Section 350.3(3) of A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure would also prohibit
charging or threatening to charge a crime not commonly charged in the jurisdiction for
the conduct involved. The same section would prohibit threatening the defendant that
if he pleads not guilty his sentence may be more severe than that imposed in similar
cases on defendants who plead guilty. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-AnmOGNMENT PRO-
cn ntrE § 350.3(3)(b), (c) (P.O.D. 1975). Again, this avoids the main issue. The
Code carefully steers clear of prohibiting charges or threats of charges that are not sta-
tistically unusual but are frequently employed to "encourage" pleas of guilty, and it does
not prohibit representations to a specific defendant that his sentence will be less severe
if he pleads guilty than if he stands trial.
248. An analogous argument can be made that following formal charge, no custodial
interrogation can take place in the absence of counsel even if the right to presence of
counsel is waived. See McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965), rev'g per curiam 1 Ohio
St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964). The defendant, who had been indicted for murder,
made a confession while riding in a car with a deputy sheriff and an assistant prosecutor;
he had made no request for counsel. The Ohio Supreme Court found the confession
to be voluntary and therefore affirmed the conviction. In reversing this judgment, the
United States Supreme Court simply cited Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964). Massiah had found a violation of the right to counsel in the use of an incrim-
inating statement elicited from the defendant by an informer after the defendant had
been indicted. Together, Massiah and McLeod can be read as prohibiting all post-indict-
ment interrogation unless an attorney is present. The court in United States ex rel.
O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969),
nearly accepted this interpretation when it held that "Massiah commands an absolute
right to counsel after indictment, thereby vitiating the validity of all oral communications
between the defendant and the police made in the absence of counsel." Id. at 636. But
the court then hedged by adding, "[O]nly a clear, explicit, and intelligent waiver may
legitimate interrogation without counsel following indictment." Id. Most courts have
held post-indictment statements made in the absence of counsel to be admissible if there
was a valid waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. De Loy, 421 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1970).
Support for the proposition advanced in the text is also available in the cases-ad-
mittedly a minority of those resolving the question-holding that a valid waiver of
Miranda rights cannot be made in the absence of counsel if counsel is already involved
in the case. See, e.g., State v. Witt, 422 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1967); People v. Arthur,
22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968) ("Once an
attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence
of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the
defendant's right to counsel").
Unfortunately, discussions of these issues generally proceed without consideration of
the underlying policy questions: Are the dangers which the presence of counsel is in-
tended to reduce significantly greater following indictment or involvement of counsel to
justify making the presence of counsel nonwaivable? Or, following involvement of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/1
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involvement of counsel will avoid overreaching-may be unrealistic,
this approach nevertheless seems best suited to the task. Under such
a rule, any statement made in response to a promise or representation
-whether concerning a collateral matter or not-would be inadmis-
sible unless counsel was present and participated in the bargaining
process. Occasionally the rule and the difficulty of obtaining represen-
tation may result in a defendant being deprived of the tactical advan-
tage of early confession. In view of the danger of overreaching,
however, this seems an acceptable cost.
Procedurally, this last alternative would best be implemented by re-
quiring the prosecution to prove that no offer or promise was made
if it offered a statement obtained without counsel present. Generally,
counsel or indictment, is the mechanical difficulty of making counsel available suffi-
ciently reduced so that a reasonable balancing of the benefits versus the costs de-
mands that the right be regarded as nonwaivable? It is likely that this inadequacy of
discussion is partially due to the failure of confession law to identify specifically the
impermissible police tactics and unacceptable conditions relating to self-incrimination.
Some analogous help is provided by the guilty plea process. Although the cases are
split, a majority of recent decisions have held that a guilty plea entered pursuant to plea
bargain is invalid if the defendant was unrepresented during the bargain. See, e.g., Gal-
larelli v. United States, 441 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1971); Anderson v. North Carolina, 221
F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963). But cf. Gotcher v. Beto, 444 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971);
People v. Bowman, 40 Ill. 2d 116, 239 N.E.2d 433 (1968). See generally Alschuler,
The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1276-78 (1975).
Standard 4.1(b) of the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function would permit
a prosecutor to engage in plea, and presumably "confession," bargaining directly with
a defendant who refused to be represented by counsel. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCATiON
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 247. The commentary urges
prosecutors to be careful to determine that an effective waiver of counsel has been made,
and the Standard itself notes:
the prosecutor would be well advised . to request that a lawyer be desig-
nated by the court or some appropriate central agency . . . to be present at
such discussions.
The commentary does not discuss the rationale for this position, but merely states that
an exception to the prohibition against negotiating directly with a defendant "must be
made, of course," for these situations. Even if the appropriateness of this standard is
accepted, the same position might not be taken with regard to confession bargaining by
police. The lack of professional standards and education might distinguish police from
prosecutors and justify a prohibition against police-defendant bargaining despite an al-
lowance of prosecutor-defendant bargaining. Nevertheless, the advice given by the
standard to prosecutors bargaining directly with defendants should be made mandatory.
Defendants cannot be made to accept or even to listen attentively to legal advice, but
efforts can be made to give them the opportunity. Appointment of an attorney to be
present and object to what he perceives as an unwise bargain would not harm the defend-
ant who is hostile to representation, and it might well benefit those nonhostile defend-
ants who passively indicate a willingness to forego representation,
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this proof would simply involve asking a few additional questions of
the witness called to testify concerning the admissibility of the confes-
sion itself; thus, the burden upon prosecutors would not be significantly
increased. If the defendant came forward with evidence of a promise
or representation, the issue would be joined, and given the prosecu-
tion's access to the facts, its control over the interrogation system, and
the great need to discourage noncounseled bargaining, the burden of
proof would appropriately be placed on the prosecution.
The effect of such a rule might be mitigated by permitting the prose-
cution to place a confession into evidence even though it was induced
by promise or representation if the prosecution could establish that the
defendant was as capable as a reasonably experienced attorney would
have been to maximize the defendant's tactical advantage under the
particular circumstances. This burden might be met, for example, by
proof that the defendant was fully informed of the facts, had significant
experience with the administration of criminal justice in the jurisdic-
tion, had the intellectual and personal capacity to drive as effective
a bargain as an experienced defense attorney, and knew when he had
achieved the best offer he was likely to get from the prosecution or
police. The danger, of course, is that this standard might be broadly
applied in practice and the exception would consume the general prohi-
bition against uncounseled, bargained confessions. On balance, it
seems unwise to include such a provision.240
249. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure would not prohibit the making
of promises during interrogation but would make inadmissible any statement induced by
a promise of "leniency for, or an improvement in the legal situation of, [the person]
or another in whom such person is interested," unless the subject had access to counsel
"for a period adequate to obtain advice concerning such inducement and the making of
such statement." A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 150.2(8) (P.O.D.
1975). This refusal to prohibit promise making is justified in the accompanying note
with the assertion that in "many" situations, the need to solve other crimes or apprehend
or convict other persons warrants inducing statements by promises. Id., Explanatory
Note § 150.2, at 65. Thus the Code assumes that it is permissible to exploit a person's
perception of his tactical situation and "use" him to solve pending crimes or to locate
subjects, as long as he is not subjected to the "ultimate' exploitation of being convicted
on the basis of this statement. Perhaps there may be situations in which the need for
such information does warrant this sort of exploitation. But the Code provides no basis
for believing that such need exists in most cases, or even in a sufficiently large per-
centage of cases; there is thus no justification for the blanket rule that the Code em-
braces. Defining those circumstances in which manipulating a subject with promises of
leniency is warranted would undoubtedly be a difficult task, but the Code does not es-
tablish the impossibility of the effort or even indicate why such an undertaking would
be sufficiently difficult to justify its abandonment.
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3. Requirement of Custody and Interrogation
In the areas both of reliance upon expectations and of ignorance or
mistake, this analysis has been based on the assumption that the most
appropriate development in the law of confessions would be further ex-
pansion and definition of the Miranda approach: a requirement that
certain information be conveyed to the subject, encouragement but not
absolute insistence upon the presence of counsel during the making of
a self-incriminatory statement, and a standard for a legally effective
waiver of the rights to have counsel present and to avoid self-incrimina-
tion. Although the Miranda decision extended this approach only to
situations in which there has been custodial interrogation,250 it is by
no means clear that the rules proposed above should be applied only
to situations in which there is both custody and interrogation.
It would seem especially inappropriate to require custody. The cus-
todial requirement in Miranda was based on the Court's conclusion that
only in such situations do the "inherently coercive" pressures requiring
protection appear. Yet the discussion here has emphasized the need
to distinguish between consideration of the subject's conscious aware-
ness, on the one hand, and factors influencing his decision on how to
act, on the other.2 5' Where the concern is with assuring adequate
awareness rather than with preventing impermissible factors to influ-
ence the decision to act, custody or the lack thereof is irrelevant. Be-
cause exploiting ignorance is offensive whether it occurs when the sub-
ject is in custody or otherwise, the above rules should be applied to
noncustodial as well as custodial situations.
Whether the rules should be limited to those situations in which
there is interrogation is a more difficult question. Insofar as requiring
an interrogation is designed to limit the rule to those situations in which
inherent coercion exists, the requirement is as inapplicable here as is
that of custody. On the other hand, the very considerations underlying
the rule in Miranda-the demand that suspects be treated with respect
for their inherent dignity-suggests that a person who volunteers a self-
incriminating statement should not be prevented from carrying out his
desire to make such a statement, however ill-based his decision may
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
251. This would be easier if the case law recognized the distinction between what
the suspect must have been aware of and whether improper influences affected his deci-
sion of how to act upon his awareness. The traditional analyses fail to separate the
two issues. See second paragraph of text following footnote 124 supra.
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be. Moreover, practical considerations urge the same result. The pic-
ture of law enforcement personnel restraining a person who enters a
station offering to confess or their holding hands over their ears to
avoid listening to his statement is scarcely an appealing one.
The matter may appear otherwise, however, if the exploitation with
which the law ought to be concerned is viewed as including not only
the taking of the statement but also its subsequent use in evidence.
Merely listening to the fruits of an ill-advised decision to confess may
perhaps involve exploitation of a sort that should be avoided, but cer-
tainly the subsequent use of that statement constitutes a significant in-
cremental exploitation of the original ignorance.252  Thus it appears
reasonable to apply the rules discussed above, whether or not inter-
rogation occurred. If a person volunteers or successfully makes a
statement without being informed of the operative facts, law enforce-
ment personnel need not take efforts to restrain or prevent this, but
must seek another usable statement-if they desire one-after there
has been compliance with the rules. For example, if a person enters
a police station and confesses to participation in a robbery which the
police, but not the subject, know also involved a killing, his initial state-
ment will not be admissible. A subsequent statement will be, however,
but only if (in addition to complying with other requirements) the of-
ficers inform the subject of the death and his potential liability for it
and, in order to avoid the second statement being the fruit of the first,
insure that he understands his initial statement is not admissible against
him.
Adoption of rules such as those proposed here cau reasonably be
expected to evoke opposition and vocal complaint of the sort that
greeted the initial Miranda decision. In addition, there may well be
a transitional period in which police failure to comply-whether be-
cause of ignorance, ill-will, or whatever-will lead to exclusion of state-
ments under disturbing circumstances. If the rules are implemented
effectively, however, there is little likelihood that the total effect upon
criminal investigation will be serious. In those few cases in which
tenable issues are raised, the applicable legal doctrines will focus di-
rectly on the issue and will provide a more effective vehicle for its reso-
lution than present voluntariness law.
V. CONCLUSION
The modem law governing admissibility of self-incriminating state-
252. See text accompanying notes 218-20 supra.
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ments has roots deep in English common law doctrine. From the ini-
tial articulation of these legal doctrines, emphasis has been placed upon
certain aspects of the defendant's conscious awareness at the time he
confessed. Early common law evidence doctrine emphasized-argu-
ably unduly-whether the statement was made in the expectation of
achieving some temporal benefit, but ignored any failure to under-
stand the operative facts, even if this lack of understanding was the
result of intentional deception by law enforcement personnel. Consti-
tutional doctrine, apparently accepting uncritically the approach of the
common law evidence doctrine, developed into a confused amalgam of
standards. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the objectives
of the constitutional standard went beyond the common law rule's con-
cern with excluding unreliable statements, the Court never developed
a meaningful distinction between the two doctrines. When the re-
quirement of voluntariness was supplemented-or supplanted-by the
objective tests, the accompanying waiver doctrine and the necessity
that waivers be voluntary, in turn, reintroduced the substance of the
common law and constitutional doctrines as major aspects of confession
law. In the post-Miranda context, however, voluntariness issues ap-
parently require that more specific attention be directed to a defend-
ant's conscious awareness than earlier doctrine required.
Running throughout the law of confessions has been a concern with
the defendant's ability to make a reasonably informed tactical choice
in deciding whether or not to make a self-incriminating statement. As-
surance of such an ability should now be expressly recognized as a
major objective of the law of confessions. It can be convincingly ar-
gued that the foundation for admission of a self-incriminating statement
should include evidence that the police informed the defendant of the
major facts and law relating to his potential criminal liability, whether
or not the subject was in custody or was interrogated. Moreover, if
a defendant comes forward with reasonable evidence that he was un-
aware of a matter of fact or law when he confessed and that such ig-
norance impeded his ability to make a reasonably informed tactical de-
cision about confessing, the prosecution should have the burden of
proving that the defendant did possess adequate understanding. Simi-
larly, by coming forward with evidence, a defendant should be able to
force the prosecution to prove that a confession was not made in rea-
sonable reliance upon an expectation of benefit if the prosecution of-
fers the confession at trial. Unless an attorney acting for, or on behalf
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of, the defendant was present, no statement made in response to a
promise or representation of benefit should be admissible. If counsel
was not present when the statement was made, the prosecution should
have the burden of proving the lack of any such promise or representa-
tion. These additional rules would directly address matters of confes-
sion law that have long been left ambiguous and would resolve them
consistently with the desirable objectives of legal limitations upon the
admissibility of confessions but without imposing undue burdens upon
investigating law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial personnel.
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